## 1NC

### 1NC – Kritik

#### Blackness exists as a metaaporia that interrogates the cyclical ways violence onto blackness is morphed and ultimately appropriated. The 1AC relies on a redemptive narrative of humanity that is fundamentally inaccessible for blacks. Their project is ultimately meant to hide and recreate moments of black death for the sake of redeeming Human life.

Wilderson 20 [Frank B. Wilderson, professor of Drama and African American studies at the University of California, Irvine, “Afropessimism”, page 13-17, JMH]

For most critical theorists writing after 1968, the word aporia is used to designate a contradiction in a text or theoretical undertaking. For example, Jacques Derrida suggests an aporia indicates “a point of undecidability, which locates the site at which the text most obviously undermines its own rhetorical structure, dismantles, or deconstructs itself.” But when I say that Black people embody a meta-aporia for political thought and action, the addition of the prefix meta- goes beyond what Derrida and the poststructuralists meant—it raises the level of abstraction and, in so doing, raises the stakes. In epistemology, a branch of philosophy concerned with the theory of knowledge, the prefix meta- is used to mean about (its own category). Metadata, for example, are data about data (who has produced them, when, what format the data are in, and so on). In linguistics, a grammar is considered as being expressed in a metalanguage, language operating on a higher level of abstraction to describe properties of the plain language (and not itself). Metadiscussion is a discussion about discussion (not any one particular topic of discussion but discussion itself). In computer science, a theoretical software engineer might be engaged in the pursuit of metaprogramming (i.e., writing programs that manipulate programs). **Afropessimism**, then, **is** less of a theory and more of **a metatheory: a critical project that, by deploying Blackness as a lens of interpretation, interrogates the unspoken, assumptive logic of Marxism, postcolonialism, psychoanalysis, and feminism through rigorous theoretical consideration of their properties and assumptive logic, such as their foundations, methods, form, and utility; and it does so, again, on a higher level of abstraction than the discourse and methods of the theories it interrogates.** Again, Afropessimism is, in the main, more of a metatheory than a theory. **It is pessimistic about the claims theories of liberation make when these theories try to explain Black suffering or when they analogize Black suffering with the suffering of other oppressed beings. It does this by unearthing and exposing the meta-aporias, strewn like land mines in what these theories of so-called universal liberation hold to be true.** If, as Afropessimism argues, Blacks are not Human subjects, but are instead structurally inert props, implements for the execution of White and non-Black fantasies and sadomasochistic pleasures, then this also means that, at a higher level of abstraction, the claims of universal humanity that the above theories all subscribe to are ~~hobbled~~ [constricted] by a meta-aporia: a contradiction that manifests whenever one looks seriously at the structure of Black suffering in comparison to the presumed universal structure of all sentient beings. Again, Black people embody a meta-aporia for political thought and action— Black people are the wrench in the works. Blacks do not function as political subjects; instead, our flesh and energies are instrumentalized for postcolonial, immigrant, feminist, LGBTQ, transgender, and workers’ agendas. These so-called **allies are never authorized by Black agendas predicated on Black ethical dilemmas. A Black radical agenda is terrifying to most people on the Left**—think Bernie Sanders—**because it emanates from a condition of suffering for which there is no imaginable strategy for redress—no narrative of social, political, or national redemption**. This crisis, no, this catastrophe, this realization that I am a sentient being who can’t use words like “being” or “person” to describe myself without the scare quotes and the threat of raised eyebrows from anyone within earshot, was crippling. I was convinced that if a story of Palestinian redemption could be told . . . its denouement would culminate in the return of the land, a spatial, cartographic redemption; and if a story of class redemption could be told . . . its denouement would culminate in the restoration of the working day so that one stopped working when surplus values were relegated to the dustbin of history, a temporal redemption; in other words, since postcolonial and working-class redemption were possible, then there must be a story to be told through which one could redeem the time and place of Black subjugation. I was wrong. **I had not dug deep enough to see that though Blacks suffer the time and space subjugation of cartographic deracination and the hydraulics of the capitalist working day, we also suffer as the hosts of Human parasites, though they themselves might be the hosts of parasitic capital and colonialism**. I had looked to theory (first as a creative writer, and only much later as a critical theorist) to help me find/create the story of Black liberation—Black political redemption. What I found instead was that **redemption, as a narrative mode, was a parasite that fed upon me for its coherence. Everything meaningful in my life had been housed under the umbrellas called “critical theory” and “radical politics.”** The parasites had been capital, colonialism, patriarchy, homophobia. And now it was clear that I had missed the boat. My parasites were Humans, all Humans—the haves as well as the have-nots. If critical theory and radical politics are to rid themselves of the parasitism that they heretofore have had in common with radical and progressive movements on the Left, that is, if we are to engage, rather than disavow, **the difference between Humans who suffer through an “economy of disposability” and Blacks who suffer by way of “social death,” then we must come to grips with how the redemption of the subaltern** (a narrative, for example, of Palestinian plenitude, loss, and restoration) **is made possible by the (re)instantiation of a regime of violence that bars Black people from the narrative of redemption**. This requires (a) an understanding of the difference between loss and absence, and (b) an understanding of how the narrative of subaltern loss stands on the rubble of Black absence. Sameer and I didn’t share a universal, postcolonial grammar of suffering. Sameer’s loss is tangible, land. The paradigm of his dispossession elaborates capitalism and the colony. When it is not tangible it is at least coherent, as in the loss of labor power. But how does one describe the loss that makes the world if all that can be said of loss is locked within the world? **How does one narrate the loss of loss? What is the “difference between . . . something to save . . . [and nothing] to lose”?** Sameer forced me to face the depth of my isolation in ways I had wanted to avoid; a deep pit from which neither postcolonial theory, nor Marxism, nor a gender politics of unflinching feminism could rescue me. Why is anti-Black violence not a form of racist hatred but the genome of Human renewal; a therapeutic balm that the Human race needs to know and heal itself? Why must the world reproduce this violence, this social death, so that social life can regenerate Humans and prevent them from suffering the catastrophe of psychic incoherence— absence? Why must the world find its nourishment in Black flesh?

#### Their world ordering is one that presents sovereignty as a solution to violence contains an implicit hierarchy that places the civil and properly political subject over the uncivil political insurgent. Their world order constitutes a disavowal of the proximity and urgency of racial terror. . This implicates all their evidence and the arrangement of them into the 1AC as justifications for the plan.

Agathangelou and Killian, 16 – Anna, Professor of Political Science and Women’s Studies @ York University and Kyle, core faculty in the Marriage and Family Therapy Program at Capella University. Time, Temporality, and Violence in International Relations: (De)fatalizing the Present, Forging Radical Alternatives. *International relations as a vulnerable space: A conversation with Fanon and Hartman about temporality and violence*. Routledge Press, p. 23-28 – iowa [revised for abelist language]

In the introduction to this book, we explored how dominant IR has conceptualized sovereignty and war (Hobbes 1996; also Ireland and Carvounas 2008) in spatialized terms. This spatialization poses theoretical limitations and practical problems, including masking and displacing time and implicating temporality. In spite of their ostensible differences, realists and critical theorists of sovereignty maintain their existing parameters when spatializing time (Walzer 1977). In this sense, the conventional dichotomy of space and time and the contours of their discourse obscure their shared assumptions and common [limitations] ~~blind spots~~. Many realists present sovereignty as a formal, stable representation of an idealized vision of political order, a solution to war or brute violence; though embodied, these historical relations are rife with tensions (Krasner 2001; Morgenthau 1951; Waltz 1979). They contain an implicit or explicit axiological hierarchy, extrapolate an account of desirable political arrangements, and posit a stable and unified conception of the state and institutional arrangements and subjectivity primed to bring about that order. When sovereignty and war are used to produce certain behaviors, perspectives, or political outcomes, they work together as a particular kind of disciplinary construct that evades time, even though time binds them. The uncritical acceptance of this displacement of time from our conceptualization of the sovereign and war generates problems for our narration of history, the sovereign, war, violence, and political subjects. We must ask whether such limited and politically circumscribed accounts become the drivers of petrified relations and the mark of death, even when espoused otherwise. Engaging with theorists who problematize the narrowly punctuated understandings of sovereignty, war, capital, and subjectivity (Hartman 2007; Marriott 2014; Mbembe 1992; Wilderson 20I0) ought to yield insights. Even more important are Saidiya Hartman's narration of the entanglements of time and slavery and Fanon 's account of violence, sovereignty, and capital. By superimposing time onto various other given states and racialized situations to show their 'difference,' both grapple with time in relation to slavery, colonization, and capitalism. They open up questions about sovereignty by creating theoretical concepts that traverse the gaps among theorists of sovereignty, history, war, violence, and capital. When we think in terms of time and temporality, the parameters of the conceptualization of violence and fatalization of the present change dramatically, allowing us to consider the complexities of lived human experience and highlight dimensions of social life that IR and certain critical postcolonial theorists have seen as irrelevant. In this chapter, in conversation with Fanon and Hartman, we point to the ruptures/tensions accompanying material technologies/the inventions, the 'real leap's in Fanon's words (Fanon 1952: 229). Fanon's real leaps are radically untimely (Marriott 2014: 518). They cannot be speculated or preempted. They are a creative invention of a grammar that grapples with the 'form of antinornies of redemption (a salvational principle that will help us overcome the injury of slavery and the long history of defeat) and irreparability' (Hartman 2002: 759). Thinking of the force of time and the event via Hartman on slavery and colonization stretches our narrow understandings of sovereign power and forces of capture, allowing us to consider imaginaries, as well as the ways institutions such as the state and market consider some subjects mere flesh outside the dialectical movement of history or capital. Although we cannot fully represent or narrate them, forces of time and the event produce problems. To a greater or lesser extent, we can mark their interjections and interruptions into life otherwise experienced as continuity: we can perceive their qualities, analyze indices of their interjection, and even make them somewhat predictable. We are affected by them; we intensify their force; we even precipitate their transformation. This chapter takes seriously Fanon's idea that 'the problem to be considered here is one of time' (Fanon 1952: 226-227). In conversation with Fanon and Hartman, we show the ways time and temporality inflect our imagination and engagement with time and vulnerability in international relations and world politics. One theorist takes the idea of time as a problem of time (Fanon 1952) and as a force, 'arbitrary and violent, that positions [the racialized subject) globally' (Murillo 2013). The other ruptures a linear understanding of the sovereign and the ways we narrate violence to exclude slavery and colonization in its gendered forms: her notion of an 'original generative act,' with the 'centrality' of its 'blood-stained gate,' posits the ontological destruction of the black woman as the 'inaugurating moment in the formation of the enslaved' within modernity's violent arena of value (Hartman 2007: 18). Both authors take seriously the way the concept of time becomes a producer of a globality whose 'ontological horizon is manufactured by scientific signifiers' (the sovereign as analogy or anarchy as metaphor) and 'the political-symbolic weapons' (da Silva 1997: 5) that produce non-Europeans as non-existent 'untimely' subjects. Those 'who thrive in the mark of death' (ibid: 5) are not covered by the ethical principles governing post-Enlightenment social configurations. In the first section, we explore temporality co-produced with a system of global raciality entangled with capital, stretching our understanding of the sovereign and its historicity. This global raciality encodes and embodies multiple orders of violence, with time a problem and a force, 'basically a fundamental feature' (Murillo 2013: 4) of politics that should not be taken for granted. In the second section, we consider colonial and postcolonial events that disrupt immersions into 'temporal continuity,' challenging easy conceptualizations of temporality and co-constituting a material indeterminacy. Slavery; coloniality, and multiple postcolonial struggles inflect the operating forces that disrupt, problematizing a present saturated with ideas about life as derivatives (i.e., financial investing in the future). We conclude with questions devised to contribute to the unthinking and untimeliness of the world, necessary to the collective designing of a decolonial project that recognizes and dismantles the mark of a fatalism and death. We live in times of speculation and preemption. Time, slavery, and colonization are interrelated and co-constituted with the world and world economy. Temporal relations can be drawn on to determine the value of subjects (as commodities) and labor (in Marx's abstract sense) in terms of market principles. Paradoxically, while modernity projects consistently argue their vision is of freedom, security, independence, and democracy for all by means of progress in science and tech­nology, capital is a temporality seeking constant innovation at any price. This market is currently in crisis. Or so we are told. Financial derivatives dominate market scandals, and, in tum, the temporality and politics of debates about the financial crisis and the antbropocene stem from financial derivatives (Agathange­lou 2013).There was a time before capital's spectacular self-imagining had fully colo­nized modem practices of knowledge, politics, and representation; still in the pro­cess of constituting its world, capitalism-to-be could not claim to have reached all natural or social limits to its self-actualization. Karl Marx calls this stage 'primi­tive accumulation' or the 'historical process of divorcing the producer from the means of production' (1990: 874-875). Outside Europe, 'primitive' accumulation came as direct force and theft: 'the treasures captured was undisguised looting, enslavement and murder flowed back to the mother-country and were turned into capital there' (ibid: 924, 917). As van Fossen perceptively notes, part of the primi­tive accumulation of capital is the use of time to exploit people: Accelerating production, exchange, and consumption raises profits and gives a comparative (or survival) advantage over competitors. The annihilation of spatial boundaries and the movement into new territories are particularly emphasized in crises, when the rate of change increases. In this 'annihilation of space and time' capitalism globalizes further and aggressively socializes new and existing workers into new time disciplines, while imposing novel conceptions of space (van Fossen 1998: 66-67, cited in Russ 2013: 168)For Marx, as Russ points out, capitalism is the degradation of human time on two registers; one 'corresponds to the history of our social relations and the other to the opposite history of our productive progress' (Russ 2013: 170). Marx reads capitalism as the theft of the workers' labor time and the 'extraction of surplus time, converted into profit, which is used to massively expand our productive capacities and infrastructure' (ibid: 170). Marx's argument is circular, Russ says; it reinserts the dichotomy of time and timelessness by focusing on the future, generating what he ca11s the illusions of history or 'privileged attempts by the timeless mind to transcend or annul history' (ibid: 4) The division of intellectual labor among the forefathers of modern reason (Rousseau, Kant, Hegel, Marx, Foucault) allows punctuations of linearity, hierarchizations, and divisions of past, present, and future. At the same time, it permits dichotomized distinctions between time and space, masculine and feminine, mind and body to be mapped onto the anarchy/sovereign/interstate structure. These produced binaries exist as analogical correlates of time/time­lessness, material/transcendental, mind/body, state of nature/sovereign, and security/insecurity, ultimately associating time and mind with order, health, and purity and associating timelessness with disorder, disease, and impurity. The projection of the sovereign's time imaginary onto a territory and onto the territory of its 'bodies' produces intersecting borders dividing mind from body, modernity from non-modernity, and order from disorder. When time is a lin­ear movement from segmented and bounded 'past' into 'present' and on to the 'future' and vice versa, a progressive or developmental model 'convert[s] historica11y specific regimes of asymmetrical power into seemingly ordinary bodily tempos and routines, which in tum organize the value and meaning of time' (Freeman 2007: 3). To problematize this linear understanding of time is to acknowledge that within the lost moments of official history, slavery time generates a discontinuous history best told through the entanglements of mul­tiple 'time[s] out of joint,' 'heterogeneit[ies that] can be felt in the bones, as a kind of skeletal dislocation.' Of course, in 'this metaphor, time has, indeed is, a body' (Freeman 2007: 1). In its newer iterations, IR has systematically evaded grappling with slavery except for a few notable postcolonial theorists (Agathangelou 2009, 2011; Blaney and Inayatullah2010; Du Bois 1999; Fanon 1967; Persuad and Walker 2001; Shil-liam 2004, 2015; Vitalis 2010). Several scholars in other disciplines have written on the 'Middle Passage' as a form through which we can understand capitalism. Some work in the humanities argues the slave trade still haunts the market logic of the twentieth century; Baucom says temporality accumulates rather than recedes, and the 'Middle Passage' represents a passage into modernity (2005: 313). Thus, the slave ship, with all its overtones of illness, bodily corruption, and violence, is originary. A lieu de memoire, it is the birthplace of a modem subjectivity at the junction of slavery and finance capital: [It] needed not only a standard set of exchange mechanisms, but a standard imaginary, a standard grammar of trust, a standard 'habit' of crediting the 'real' existence of abstract values, such as credit, with abstract 'slaves' func-tioning as 'a standard measure' through which to express the value of the range of commodities and currencies available for exchange. <end page 26> He connects this to the Zong case, when the ship's captain murdered African captives by throwing them into the sea so as to translate their bodies and their potential for labor via insurance into currency and evacuated them of their singular characteristics by turning them into abstract (and universal) units of exchange. This facet makes it a 'truth event,' identifying 'not a marginal or local abnormality within the system but the global abnormality of the system itself' (ibid: 118-22). Baucom's reading places the historian as a melanchoic witness to history's aggrieved. History, he says, is not a 'property of the past but the property the present inherits as its structuring material and the property (both affective and instrumental) the past holds in the present' (ibid: 330). The body politics and power relations made possible by working with time, then, link temporality and raciality, temporality and sexuality. As categories, raciality and sexuality are more complex when we think them from the vantage of the slave and slavery, especially the flesh of the enslaved woman. Spillers tells us: I would make a distinction ... between 'body' and 'flesh' and impose that distinction as the central one between captive and liberated subject positions. In that sense, before the 'body' there is the 'flesh,' that zero degree of social conceptualization that does not escape concealment under the brush of dis-course, or the reflexes of iconography ... If we think of the 'flesh' as a primary narrative, then we mean its seared, divided, ripped-apartness, riveted to the ship's hole, fallen, or 'escaped' overboard. (1987: 66) Making these distinctions depends on the gratuitous violence upon the slave, the object to whom anything anytime can be done and whose life can be squandered. The timely erection of this New World Order, with its human sequence written in blood, represents for its African and Indigenous peoples a scene of actual mutilation, dismemberment, and exile. The enslavement marks a theft of the body and land and the willfully violent severing of the captive body from its motive will and its active desire, all the while generating fortunes for the captor. This gratuitous intimacy may take the form of a capture of a body, a source of irresistible, destructive sensuality, its translation into potential pornotroping, a thing, and/or property, as attempts to 'emplot the slave in a narrative' (Hartman and Wilderson 2003: 184) or to incorporate slaves as sovereign subjects within official nationalist discourses (Spillers 1987: 66--69) may obliterate them. This distinction between body and flesh (the captive body) is significant for knowledge/power and has a temporal politics in the form of evolutionary notions of flesh, such as throwbacks or 'remnants,' with (white) sexuality's development following a linear trajectory of heterosexual reproduction (Freeman 2007). What precipitates the possibility of a coherent story, Wilderson tells us, following Hartman, is the act of murder and enslavement. The only means of entry into civil society, history, and temporality are entitlements, sovereignty, and immigration or 'narratives of arrival' (Wilderson 2003: 236). However, within these narratives <end page 27> the 'black American subject does not generate historical categories of Entitlement, Sovereignty, and/or Immigration for the record,' as if this 'flesh' constituted through gratuitous violence is 'off the record' (Hartman 1997: 24; Wilderson 2003: 236). So how do we write those 'impossibilities to illuminate those practices that speak to the limits of most available narratives to explain the position of the enslaved' (Hartman and Wilderson 2003: 184)? There is, in other words, a temporal gap in the production of a narrative that explains how discourses always articulate the slave as 'lagging' humanity, unable to be co-constituted even with work (Wilderson 2003) or integrated into civil society as a sovereign subject or sovereign laborer. These narrations bind labor in a way that keeps the afterlives of slavery (Hartman 1997) animated. How the black body is narrated has implications for the manner in which temporality becomes a dividing barometer of raciality: 'From the very beginning, we were meant to be accumulated and die' (Wilderson 2003: 238). The theoretical slippages from singular conditions to particularities or identities are one and the same, but Wilderson ruptures them, arguing beginnings in narratives do not entail the same kinds of ends for the slave (Wilderson 2010, 2003). The 'time of slavery,' that is, 'the relation between the past and the present, the horizon of loss, the extant legacy of slavery, the antinomies of redemption (a salvational principle that will help us overcome the injury of slavery and the long history of defeat) and irreparability' (Hartman 1997: 759), has an afterlife. In assembling and narrating the 'primal scene' (Farley 2005: 54), the master inflicts violence on this almost-gone subject, turning it into flesh by appropriating it and transfiguring it into a 'fiction of power' (Hartman and Wilderson 2003: 184). In 'narrat[ing] a certain impossibility,' Hartman speaks to the 'limits of most available narratives' (ibid: 184). It is important that the writing of history not sneak in a liberal sequential registering of more slave entities that could potentially become integrated into a raciality matrix. By bringing the position of the unthought into 'view without making it a locus of positive value,' 'without trying to fill in the void' (ibid: 185), Hartman makes her own work, her own cultural history/literary genre, experiential rather than teleological, simultaneously challenging familiar stories and historical teleological accounts that presume slavery is a memory. Devices such as focalizing the 'unthought' violences toward the making of slaves, the emphasis on the fifteenth century's ongoing effect on the present, and graphic descriptions of the brutality on the ships from Africa to the Americas and Europe are pivotal in making the past present. A description of how the positionality of black and white women was understood and approached differently during the slave trade has implications for how their positionalities are read today, including their rights and possibilities of freedom. Certain technologies of governance consolidated around this time included the evolution of juridical, philosophical, and narrative structures, without taking into account the slave trade. Take the notion of consent, philosophically articulated as universal but apparently disarticulated by blackness. More specifically, descriptions of the lives of slave women in the United States point to how female slaves as fungible objects <end page 28> differed ontologically from white women who might be house servants - subordinated but with the possibility of being free: Being forced to submit to the will of the master in all things defines the predicament of slavery. The opportunity for nonconsent [in this case, sex] is required to establish consent, for consent is meaningless if refusal is not an option ... Consent is unseemly in a context in which the very notion of subjectivity is predicated upon the negation of will. (Hartman 1997: 111) Slavery's temporality does not register in many of our accounts of juridical and international frameworks. Yet the ontological destruction of the body is achieved by violence, while value is formed to effect a complete disavowal of the body's existence. The key to grasping the originary (violent and occluded) moment of the transmutation of flesh into some commodity and value into subjectivity is found in the reconciliation of the binarism that produces and is produced by value. Discussing slavery is important for recognizing the procedural modalities functioning within the ontological disposition of modernity as it relates to blackness: the primacy of carnality and the denial of the flesh structurally. This distinction is nuanced and elusive, but it is important to understanding liberalism as a set of politico-economic discourses that mediate a kind of sovereignty, as well as an experiential protocol that, through its specified a priori version of sovereignty, animates and translates property relations. 'Like women,' writes McClintock, 'Africans (both men and women) are figured not as historic agents but as frames for the commodity, valued for their exhibition alone' (1994: 215). To this, she adds: 'Value, beside itself, finds itself if only for a moment in the place of the Other, who or which is always without value' (1994: 216). Value, then, as both form and force enters the world accompanied by its fungible commodity, but this commodity is effaced by violences of value, thereby suggesting 'value is violence' and 'value is violence disguised or dis-figured' (Barrett 1999: 219; also Marx 1965).

#### Expansion of the internet and capital technologies sustains algorithmic thinking into policy making itself. These technological forms of growth bracket out black life for the sake of sustaining market efficiency and the super exploitation of blackness. Reject their form of predatory inclusion and prefer the alternatives approach towards resistance.

Cottom 2020 [Tressie McMillan Cottom, School of Information and Library Sciences, University of North Carolina, October 9, 2020, “Where Platform Capitalism and Racial Capitalism Meet: The Sociology of Race and Racism in the Digital Society”, American Sociology Association, SAGE Journals, <https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/2332649220949473>, Pages 442-444, JMH]

An early reader of this article posed a provocative question: is there anything analytically distinct about the Internet? My answer revealed my priors. “Of course the Internet is distinct,” I wanted to say. But that is arguing from an embarrassingly basic logical fallacy. The question of what the Internet does analytically that, say, “capital” or “economy” or “culture” or “organizations” does not already do is important. My answer is debatable, but the debate is worthwhile. I do not know if the Internet adds something analytically distinct to our social inquiries, but it adds something analytical precision. Other constructs capture important dimensions of social life in a digital society. For instance, **one can argue that Silicon Valley is a racial project** (Noble and Roberts 2019; Watters 2015) **or a sociohistorical construction of racial meanings, logics, and institutions** (Omi and Winant 2014). White racial frames (Feagin 2020) or color-blind racism (Bonilla-Silva 2006) can elucidate how ironic humor about Black people, Muslims, and immigrants in online gaming platforms reproduces “offline” racism (Fairchild 2020; Gray 2012). These are just two examples of noteworthy approaches taken to studying Internet technologies and “mainstream” sociological interests (i.e., economic cultures and discourses, respectively). Still, sociological practice does not systematically engage with the social relations of Internet technologies as analytical equals to the object of study. **If there is anything particular about Internet technologies for sociological inquiry, we should make it explicit.** And once explicit**, we should give it the same theoretical care as states, capital, and power.** Daniels (2013) points us in the right direction when she argued that, “the reality is that in the networked society . . . racism is now global . . ., as those with regressive political agendas rooted in white power connect across national boundaries via the Internet, a phenomenon that runs directly counter to Omi and Winant’s conceptualization of the State as a primary structural agent in racial formation.” Daniels named to the global nature of both racism and the networks of capital we gesture to when we say Internet or digital. It is an argument for bringing back the political economy of race and racism. Internet technologies are specific in how they have facilitated, legitimized, and transformed states and capital within a global racial hierarchy. An app with which underemployed skilled labor sells services to customers (e.g., TaskRabbit) might be a U.S. racial project. But the capital that finances the app is embedded in transnational capital flows. Global patterns of racialized labor that determine what is “skill” and what is “labor” mediate the value of labor and the rents the platform can extract for mediating the laborer-customer relationship. Even the way we move money on these platforms— “Cash App me!”—is networked to supranational firms such as PayPal and Alibaba (Swartz 2020). Internet technologies have atomized the political economy of globalization with all the ideas about race, capital, racism, and ethnicity embedded within. An understanding of the political economy of Internet technologies adds a precise formulation of how this transformation operates in everyday social worlds: **privatization through opacity and exclusion via inclusion.** Both characteristics are distinctly about the power of Internet technologies. And each characteristic is important for the study of race and racism. Understanding platform capitalism helps us understand how these two characteristics are important. Internet technologies have networked forms of capital (Srnicek and De Sutter 2017; Zhang 2020), consolidated capital’s coercive power (Azar, Marinescu, and Steinbaum forthcoming; Dube et al. 2020), flattened hierarchical organizations (Treem and Leonardi 2013; Turco 2016), and produced new containers for culture (Brock 2020; Noble 2018; Patton et al. 2017; Ray et al. 2017). By that definition, **the Internet has amplified and reworked existing social relations. Platform capitalism moves us toward the analytical importance of Internet technologies as sociopolitical regimes**. Platforms produce new forms of currency (i.e., data) and new forms of exchange (e.g., cryptocurrencies), and they structure new organizational arrangements among owners, workers, and consumers (see “prosumers”). Even more important for the study of race and racism, platforms introduce new layers of opacity into every facet of social life. So-called mate markets move from neighborhood bars to dating apps, moving family formation behind a platform’s velvet rope (Hobbs, Owen, and Gerber 2017; OllierMalaterre, Jacobs, and Rothbard 2019). It transforms public education into “online delivery,” locking student-teacher-school interactions into privately controlled black boxes (Woolcock and Narayan 2000). “Smart cities” extract our routine activities from public life, which shapes democratic access to how our communities are governed (Brauneis and Goodman 2018; O’Neil 2017; Walsh and O’Connor 2019). A colleague recently bemoaned the difficulty of negotiating with Facebook for data on political attitudes. Many sociologists share her lament. In our routine work we realize that different rules produce and govern data, from survey to observational, than the rules even 20 years ago. That is but a minor example of the myriad ways platform capitalism’s opacity is qualitatively distinct. That opacity has a logic. Pasquale (2015) argued that ours is a “black box society.” Administrative opacity is a deliberate strategy to manage regulatory environments. It shields organizations, both public and private, from democratic appeals for access and equity. **As the state legitimizes the use of digital and algorithmic decision making, it also creates new data worlds** (Gray 2018; Milan and van der Velden 2016) to which few sociologists have access. **The inaccessibility of these data is part of their value to state and capital interests. Private data worlds where decision making can be veiled from democratic inquiry fuel economic and political commitment to more datafication**. This brings about more secrecy. Sometimes, a firm or organization performs secrecy just for the sake of secrecy. This reinforces its ability to do so and its right to do so (Seaver 2017). Pasquale outlined three types of secrecy strategies. One of those strategies, obfuscation, is particularly relevant to the study of race and racism. Theoretically, obfuscation operates much like willful whiteness that can always claim ignorance of statistical discrimination, for example, because it owns the means of discovery. Obfuscation does not mean that someone or some organization does not know these data. It means that the information is difficult to access and often couched in needlessly complex technical jargon or process. As we privatize public goods, Internet technologies promise cost savings (usually by reducing labor) and increased efficiency of whatever task is at hand. Those Internet technologies introduce a web of data extraction and valuation that has significant economic value (Zuboff 2015). Obfuscation becomes a technique of privatization through two processes. One, it extracts data that would have previously been public, publicly available or legally discoverable. Two, it expands obfuscation as a logic, even in organizations or institutions that have a public mandate. When full privatization is not possible, obfuscation privatizes information by making it inaccessible in practice**. Information is the vessel for social actions and social facts. If information is inaccessible, the objects of everyday life are too.** Although secrecy and means testing for information have always been features of the administrative state and of capital, platform capitalism is about the scale of secrecy, the value of secrecy, and the logic of obfuscation. By thinking about the politics of the Internet technologies embedded in the current political economy, we more precisely capture a set of social relations than occurs when Internet technologies are tangential to our analyses. Thinking about the analytical utility of the Internet also brought to mind one of the most vexing dialectal tensions of racism under platform capitalism. The Internet expands. This “pervasive expansion” (Castells 2010) is near total. It is no longer a question of whether one is “online.” Whether or not one is online, one’s life chances are shaped by online (Fourcade and Healy 2013). That settles the thing. The expansion requires bringing people into the social relations of Internet technologies. That can happen as a user (Ritzer 2015) or as a site of extraction (Amrute 2016) or by producing a surplus population of users and nonusers (McCarthy 2016). This expansive quality sets us on a crash course with a fundamental understanding of what race does. **Race (as deployed by racism) excludes. It also devalues and stratifies**. But exclusion is one of the most studied aspects of race and racism in social science. The racialized social hierarchy produced these Internet technologies. Also, **Internet technologies became a dominant tool of capital because of their ability to expand markets and consumer classes. To both expand and exclude, the platform-mediated era of capitalism that grew from Internet technologies specializes in predatory inclusion**. **Predatory inclusion is the logic, organization, and technique of including marginalized consumer-citizens into ostensibly democratizing mobility schemes on extractive terms** One of the clearest articulations of predatory inclusion comes from work on education, where educational access and its attendant social rewards are extended to excluded groups on extractive terms (Dwyer 2018; Eaton et al. 2016; Seamster and Charron-Chénier 2017). With higher education, predatory inclusion looks like expanding “access” to higher education (and its relation to labor market and status returns) by offering online college degrees that both for-profit and not-for-profit organizations market to African American women (Cottom 2017). When those African American women disproportionately enroll in these institutions, they most often do so by taking on student loans. Some of those loans are publicly subsidized and others are from private lenders. These students’ loans have been shown to be harder to pay off, easier to default on, and more likely to reach negative amortization than student loans taken out at other kinds of institutions by other kinds of students (Scott-Clayton and Li 2016). African American women’s inclusion in higher education comes at a high individual price and with a significant profit to the financial caretakers of that extraction. Predatory inclusion happens not only in education. It operates through credit schemes, consumer debt (Charron-Chénier and Seamster forthcoming) and small business lending (Nopper 2010). It frames how minorities are “included” in homeownership schemes that pervert the value of ownership because of bad loans and racist social policy (Taylor 2019). Although not explicitly named, another example is found in the “gig economy.” This is where waged work has become harder to secure and surplus labor is nominally included in the “digital economy” on extractive terms. These schemes could happen without Internet technologies. But they happen using Internet technologies, and Internet technologies have made these cases more efficient. Moreover, platform capitalism generates the logic, incentives, and capital for these predatory inclusion practices. Whether they use the Internet to affect these practices, the logic of capital that financializes through algorithmic means at a scale made possible because of network technologies makes these particular processes of the digital society

#### Slavery morphs and recodes itself in different ways- it relies on the sadism of liberal progress narratives to perfect itself and maintain “life”. Only the alternative can disrupt this project and render these promises incoherent.

Wilderson 20 [Frank B. Wilderson, professor of Drama and African American studies at the University of California, Irvine, “Afropessimism”, page 94-96, JMH]

Northup’s book implies, without stating directly, why this generalization of sadism—brutality as the constituent element of family bonding—cannot be understood as being triggered by transgressions. It is as ubiquitous as the air he breathes. “It was rarely a day passed without more whippings . . . It is the literal, unvarnished truth, that the crack of the lash and the shrieking of slaves, can be heard from dark till bedtime . . .” Patsey and Solomon, unlike Stella and me, were living in a place and time when civil society and the Human were neither ashamed nor embarrassed by this. A thousand miles upriver and one hundred twenty six years later, Josephine was shocked by this inheritance, but it didn’t take her long to recover, and to claim it. Though the structure of Stella’s “life” (or, better, **the paradigm of social death**, for the quotation marks are essential here) **cannot be reconciled with the** structure of Josephine’s life (or **the paradigm of social life**), there is a connection. But **this connection is parasitic and perverse—regardless of what the socially dead Black person (i.e., Stella and Patsey) or the socially alive Human (i.e., Josephine or Mary Epps) might say about their “relationship.”** It is parasitic because White and non-Black subjectivity cannot be imbued with the capacity for selfknowledge and intersubjective community without anti-Black violence; without, that is, the violence of social death. In other words, **White people and their junior partners need anti-Black violence to know they’re alive.\*** If Hattie McDaniel were to truly die, as Stella proclaimed, it would be tantamount to the death of a parasite’s host. This is what makes social death something more surreal than the end of breath. It is, in the words of David Marriott, a deathliness that saturates life, not an embalming; a resource for Human renewal. **It is perverse for many reasons: one of which is the fact that as civil society matures** (from 1853 to December 1979, when it all went south with Josephine)—and we move historically from the obvious technologies of chattel slavery to universal suffrage, the discourse of human rights, and the concept of universal access to civil society— the anti-Black violence necessary for the elaboration and maintenance of White (and non-Black) subjectivity gets repressed and becomes increasingly unavailable to conscious (as opposed to unconscious) speech. (“I judge people by the quality of their character,” as Dr. King said, “and not the color of their skin”; or the commonly spoken, “At the end of the day, we’re all Americans and we’re in this together”— and other such malarkey of the conscious mind.) But the pageantries of naked and submissive Black flesh, pageantries of bleeding backs and buttocks, whip marks, amputations, and faces closed by horse bits, provide evidence of the role sadism plays in the constitution of White subjectivity, and *12 Years a Slave* makes this visible on the screen, despite its repression in the narrative of both the film and civil society writ large. It is tempting and commonplace to reduce Mary and Edwin Epps’s sadism to individual psychopathology. Or one might think that Edwin Epps is one of a group of exceptionally sadistic people who lived in an exceptionally sadistic time and place. But the film, and to an even greater extent the autobiography, sees (rather than narrates) sadism—the sexual perversion in which gratification is obtained by inflicting physical or mental pain on a love object—not as the individual pathology of a handful of people, but as a generalized condition; generalized in that pleasure, as a constituent element of communal life, cannot be disentangled from anti-Black violence. Conventionally, **the object of sadism can**, tomorrow, **become the subject of sadism**. But the sadism that constitutes the spectacles of *12 Years a Slave*, and which constitutes early nineteenth century society, is not imbued with such reciprocity. The Slaves of social death cannot switch places and make Edwin Epps or his equally cruel wife the love objects of their collective sadism. If they did so in private (if Patsey beat Edwin or Mary in a private bedroom encounter, for example) **it is because such a reversal was occasioned and allowed—in other words, the master used his prerogative and power to play a different game, one in which he suffers because suffering fulfills his fantasy and because, unlike the Slave, his fantasies have “objective value.”** Such role reversals do not imbue the encounter with reciprocity. **The changes that begin to occur after the Civil War and up through the Civil Rights Movement, Black Power, and the American election of a Black president are merely changes in the weather. Despite the fact that the sadism is no longer played out in the open as it was in l840, nothing essential has changed.**

#### Only through embracement of disorder and incoherence via the alternative are we able create revolutionary politics that disrupt the generative mechanism of civil society.

Wilderson 20 [Frank B. Wilderson, professor of Drama and African American studies at the University of California, Irvine, “Afropessimism”, page 249-252, JMH]

Again, though this is a bond between Blacks and Whites (or, more precisely, between Black and non-Blacks), it is produced by a violent intrusion that does not cut both ways. Whereas the phobic bond is an injunction against Black psychic integration and Black filial and affilial relations, it is the lifeblood of White psychic integration and filial (which is to say, domestic) and affilial (or institutional) relations. For whoever says “rape” says Black; whoever says “prison” says Black; and whoever says “AIDS” says Black—the Negro is a phobogenic object: a past without a heritage, the map of gratuitous violence, and a program of complete disorder. If a social movement is to be neither social democratic nor Marxist, in terms of its structure of political desire, then it should grasp the invitation of social death embodied in Black beings. **If we are to be honest with ourselves, we must admit that the “~~Negro~~” “Black” has been inviting Whites, as well as civil society’s junior partners** (for example, Palestinians, Native Americans, Latinx) **to the dance of social death for hundreds of years, but few have wanted to learn the steps.** They have been, and remain today (even in the most anti-racist movements, like anti-colonial insurgency) invested elsewhere. Black liberation, as a prospect, makes radicalism more dangerous to the U.S. and the world. **This is not because it raises the specter of an alternative polity (such as socialism, or community control of existing resources), but because its condition of possibility and gesture of resistance function as a politics of refusal and a refusal to affirm, a program of complete disorder. One must embrace its disorder, its incoherence, and allow oneself to be elaborated by it, if indeed one’s politics are to be underwritten by a revolutionary desire.** What other lines of accountability are there when slaves are in the room? There is nothing foreign, frightening, or even unpracticed about the embrace of disorder and incoherence. The desire to be embraced, and elaborated, by disorder and incoherence is not anathema in and of itself. No one, for example, has ever been known to say, Gee whiz, if only my orgasms would end a little sooner, or maybe not come at all. Few so-called radicals desire to be embraced, and elaborated, by the disorder and incoherence of Blackness—and the state of political movements in the U.S. today is marked by this very Negrophobogenisis: Gee-whiz, if only Black rage could be more coherent, or maybe not come at all. Perhaps there is something more terrifying about the joy of Black than there is in the joy of sex (unless one is talking sex with a Negro). Perhaps coalitions today prefer to remain inorgasmic in the face of civil society—with hegemony as a handy prophylactic, just in case. If, **through this stasis or paralysis, they try to do the work of prison abolition, that work will fail, for it is always work from a position of coherence (such as the worker) on behalf of a position of incoherence of the Black: radical politics morphed into extensions of the master’s prerogative.** In this way, **social formations on the Left remain blind to the contradictions of coalitions between Humans and Slaves. They remain coalitions operating within the logic of civil society and function less as revolutionary promises than as crowding-out scenarios of Black antagonisms, simply feeding Black people’s frustration.** Whereas the positionality of the worker (whether a factory worker demanding a monetary wage, an immigrant, or a white woman demanding a social wage) gestures toward the reconfiguration of civil society, the positionality of the Black subject (whether a prison-slave or a prison-slave-in-waiting) gestures toward the disconfiguration of civil society. From the coherence of civil society, the Black subject beckons with the incoherence of civil war, a war that reclaims Blackness not as a positive value, but as a politically enabling site, to quote Fanon, of “absolute dereliction.” It is a “scandal” that rends civil society asunder. Civil war, then, becomes the unthought, but never forgotten, understudy of hegemony. It is a Black specter waiting in the wings, an endless antagonism that cannot be satisfied (via reform or reparation), but must nonetheless be pursued to the death. But lest we forget, this is not a question of volition. It is not as simple as waking up in the morning and deciding, in one’s conscious mind, to “do the right thing.” **For when we scale up from the terrain of the psyche to the terrain of armed struggle, we may be faced with a situation in which the eradication of the generative mechanism of Black suffering is something that is not in anyone’s interest.** Eradication of the generative mechanisms of Black suffering is not in the interest of Palestinians and Israelis, as my shocking encounter with my friend Sameer, on a placid hillside, suggests; because his anti-Black phobia mobilizes the fantasy of belonging that the Israeli state might otherwise strip him of. For him to secure his status as a relational being (if only in his unconscious), his unconscious must labor to maintain the Black as a genealogical isolate. “The shame and humiliation runs even deeper if the Israeli soldier was an Ethiopian Jew.” The Israelis are killing the Palestinians, literally; but psychic life, Human capacity for relations, is vouchsafed by a libidinal relay between them and their common labor to avoid ~~“niggerization”~~ [~~negroization~~] [racialization] (Fanon). **This relay is the generative mechanism that makes life life. It is also the generative mechanism of Black suffering and isolation. The end of this generative mechanism would mean the end of the world. We would find ourselves peering into the abyss.** This trajectory is too iconoclastic for working-class, post-colonial, and/or radical feminist conceptual frameworks. The Human need to be liberated in the world is not the same as the Black need to be liberated from the world; which is why even their most radical cognitive maps draw borders between the living and the dead. Finally**, if we push this analysis to the wall, it becomes clear that eradication of the generative mechanisms of Black suffering is also not in the interests of Black revolutionaries. For how can we disimbricate Black juridical and political desire from the Black psyche’s desire to destroy the Black imago, a desire that constitutes the psyche?** In short, bonding with Whites and non-Blacks over phobic reactions to the Black imago provides the Black psyche with the only semblance of psychic integration it is likely to have: the need to destroy a Black imago and love a White ideal. “In these circumstances, having a ‘white’ unconscious may be the only way to connect with—or even contain—the overwhelming and irreparable sense of loss. The intruding fantasy offers the medium to connect with the lost internal object, the ego, but there is also no ‘outside’ to this ‘real fantasy’ and the effects of intrusion are irreparable.” This raises the question, who is the speaking subject of Black insurgent testimony; who bears witness when the Black insurgent takes the stand? Who is writing this book?

### 1NC – China

#### Their calls for mutuality between the US and China under liberalism creates the surrogate effect, selling technological innovation while erasing the racialized and gendered labor necessary for its smooth functioning

Atanasoski and Vora, 19 – Neda Atanasoski, Professor of Feminist Studies and Critical Race and Ethnic Studies at the University of California, Santa Cruz; Kalindi Vora, Associate Professor of Gender, Sexuality and Women's Studies at UC Davis; 2019(*Surrogate Humanity: Race, Robots, and the Politics of Technological Futures*, Duke University Press, Accessed via Michigan Libraries, pg 89-91, bam)

The “robot” Jibo, also described as a platform, represents a technological update to the domestic architecture that supports the seeming autonomy of the liberal subject. Here, technoliberalism reinscribes a racialized and gendered service labor infrastructure that derives from the domestic division of labor under colonialism. It functions as an architectural update to the hidden passageways and serving spaces in US antebellum residential architecture that were meant to hide the enslaved “hands that served” and yield the service without any sociality between those served and the servants.3 As with the development of technologies promoting outsourced service industries in India built on a design imperative of importing the labor but not the lives of workers, as described in Vora’s book Life Support, Jibo is designed to preserve the architecture of erased service work that allows the nuclear hetero-patriarchal family economic unit to continue.

In this chapter we address how present-day disappearances of human bodies take place in the information milieu, specifically through platforms intended to disguise human labor as machine labor. Whereas Jibo, as a physical robot, can be brought into the center of the hetero-nuclear household without disrupting the erasure of human domestic and service work that supports the reproduction of the whiteness and patriarchy of this family form, the information milieu must rely on a rearrangement of space to uphold the myth of human-free labor under technoliberalism. The racial grammar of the surrogate effect is here tethered to the programming architectures of virtual spaces that erase the sociality of laboring bodies. These disappearances are a part of technoliberal innovation related to the racial dynamics of collaborative robotics and the sharing economy that we addressed in chapter 2, even as they introduce a different aspect of the fantasy of human-free labor. Thus, we might ask, what is the relationship between a techno-futurity in which the human is engulfed into an Internet of Things, and a present in which human labor continues to be irreplaceable even as it is hidden beneath the fantasy of what ai can accomplish? Concealing the human worker as the source of information processing, data collection, and service work has become a central feature that enables the conception of the fourth industrial revolution and the second machine age as the socioeconomic paradigm shifts. Why must the worker be concealed to enable the growth of the digital economy? Design projects that hide service labor advance the project of technoliberalism by contributing to the seeming inevitability of the domestic realm as an atomized and apparently autonomous economy where the support of life is an individual, rather than a social, concern.

Analyzing platforms including the Alfred Club service website and Amazon Mechanical Turk (amt), a data management service, we turn our attention to how humans themselves are performing the work of technologies that are claimed to replace the need for human workers. This is what amt has framed, tongue in cheek, as artificial artificial intelligence. Our emphasis on the disappearance of human labor allows us to theorize surrogate humanity as not just about a set of new technologies, but more importantly, about how the fantasy of human-free social environments, including everything from cyberspace to the domestic sphere, is concerned with replacing the racialized and gendered surrogates enabling freedom for the universalized liberal figure of the human with technological sur- rogates. In other words, we argue that technologies that erase human workers are designed to perform the surrogate effect for consumers, who consume the reassurance of their own humanity along with the service offered.4 The surrogate effect can command capital, as well, when venture capitalists who fetishize automation and digitization see apps that offer a technological veneer to what are in fact long-standing human services.5

Platforms like amt and Alfred Club perform the surrogate effect by affirming the humanity and subjecthood of their users in ways that both rehearse and innovate upon the prior racial and gendered politics of labor. Put otherwise, emerging technologies like amt and Alfred Club simultaneously exploit gendered and effaced service work and demand that the worker participate in effacing herself as a subject.6 Drawing attention to the surrogate effect produced by the socio-spatial dynamics of distancing and erasure of service workers within service platforms enables us to cen- ter questions of racialized and gendered difference where they otherwise may be displaced or obscured in the postracial fictions of technoliberalism. Analysis of the surrogate effect thus requires a feminist, critical race and postcolonial science studies approach to the field of labor politics. The examples in this chapter show how the surrogate effect delimits what counts as work, and what counts as a valued social relation, because it defines those who count as recognizable subjects in those areas.

#### Garofalo is in the context of China modeling the EU

Garofalo 21 (their article)– Luigi, interviewing Angela Zhang, chinese law expert and author of the book "Chinese Antitrust Exceptionalism". “Why the rise of China’s antitrust policy against tech companies? Interview with Angela Zhang (Chinese law expert)”, Key4Biz, <https://www.key4biz.it/why-the-rise-of-chinas-antitrust-policy-against-tech-companies-interview-with-angela-zhang-chinese-law-expert/368524/>, 07-13-2021

Key4biz. In your book, you talk about a clear interdependence between how China regulates and how China is regulated. Is Beijing going to soon compete with Washington and Brussels in setting the rules for global businesses? Can we hope for a future regulatory alignment between the three?

Angela Zhang. The first question is whether Beijing is going to compete with the US and the EU in setting global standards for businesses. At this point, I see this is quite unlikely. In her new book The Brussels Effect, Columbia Law professor Anu Bradford argues that the EU is setting up the regulatory standards which are emulated by many different jurisdictions. I see the China model to be unlikely to be adopted by other countries, because of the Chinese unique institutional setting, because of the power imbalances between the government and businesses. In China, the government is very powerful and is a dominant player in the whole regulatory process, whereas in the US you see that businesses have more of an equal footing vis-à-vis the government, because they fiercely defend themselves in confronting the government and the US judiciary plays a very important role in constraining agencies’ actions as well. So I do not see that the Chinese regulatory model is going to be replicated very easily in other jurisdictions, particularly in Western democracies. As of whether we can be hopeful for future regulatory alignment between the three, in my book I did end with a hopeful note; while China can hold hostage foreign companies using its antitrust law or other regulatory control, foreign governments can similarly hold hostage Chinese companies; and we have already seen that in the past few years. Both the EU and US have tightened their control over Chinese tech companies. The fact that the two sides can exchange hostage is actually a good thing, because this exchange can facilitate cooperation between the two sides and make peace more likely.

#### The underlying principle of deterrence behind their Taiwan scenario as simultaneous aggression and vulnerability is antiblack by demanding a particular standard of action from blackness—prefer the alt.

Canter, 19—Wesleyan University (Selene, “Translating the Ineffable: Deconstruction and the Political,” <https://wesscholar.wesleyan.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3119&context=etd_hon_theses>, dml)

In Aikido, the attacker makes themselves vulnerable by reaching out and striking into space. This act of reaching out invites the defender to respond with their own move. What happens, then, when we translate these principles of Aikido into our social and political life? While advocating for the uncomfortable and precarious movement of vulnerability, Sexton simultaneously recognizes the inherent racialized power dynamics involved in this kind of self-exposure. He asks: “Is it any surprise, in an anti-black world, that these gestures are confused by so many, those that mistake an invitation for a threat? How many have resented the invitation blackness makes and defended themselves against it with lethal violence?”58 The most extreme example of this can be found in the recurring atrocities of police violence and brutality against black victims, often unarmed. The image of black persons raising their hands in a forced act of vulnerability demanded by the police comes to mind here. Furthermore, this act of vulnerability is often conversely taken as a threat by the officer at hand. “Hands Up, Don’t Shoot” or simply “hands up” became a slogan common at Black Lives Matter protests, which targeted police violence following the 2014 shooting of Michael Brown and the eyewitness account by Dorian Johnson who claimed that Brown had his hands up when shot.59 His death followed that of Eric Garner, Freddie Gray, and Trayvon Martin. When Charles Kinsey was shot by a police officer in 2016, he was unarmed and lying on the ground with his hands in the air.60 Charleena Lyles was shot and killed in Seattle after calling 911 and letting the police into her own home.61 And the number of victims shot by officers who have perceived the black victim’s movement of retreat to be attempts to reach for a gun in their pocket is countless.62 All this to say that the gesture of the outstretched hand is not some metaphor for the peaceful coming together of people from different cultural, ethnic and racial backgrounds in a celebration of a common humanity. Rather, the negative defensive gesture must be about radically rethinking the construction of aggression within contemporary politics, recognizing all the potential dangers and precarities of living in an anti-black world.

On Passivity and Resistance

Sexton is interested in the contradictory role that passivity plays as a type of activity. He describes our passive state of being in the world as a type of response to the things around us. “We are, in a very basic way, always responding to the world,” he writes, “to ourselves, to ourselves to the world in ourselves, to ourselves in the world, more than we are initiating in thought and action.”63 This notion of passivity as a state of response creates room for other beings, known and unknown, to emerge, exist, and communicate. Here, Sexton is concerned with the constant demand for action by activists and intellectuals alike. He thus asks: “Why, in our political and intellectual circles, all the pointed concern about activity, why the worry, or fear, about being misunderstood as passive, individually and collectively?”64 For Sexton, it is precisely the “tension between active/passive states,” our fear of being passive and therefore complicit by not taking action, that provides the foundation for the various reproductions of differences of race, gender, sexuality, class, etc.65 Drawing on Fanon’s psycho-political account of self-liberation (i.e. liberation from the racialized self), Sexton explores the generative potential of passivity as a form of intervention. In doing so, Sexton draws on a question, posed to him by Wilderson, regarding a specific passage in Black Skin, White Masks. In addressing a black patient’s unconscious desire to “turn white,” Fanon explains that his own duty as a psychoanalyst is to “help his patient become conscious of his unconscious […] to put him in a position to choose action (or passivity) with respect to the real sources of conflict– that is, toward the social structures.”66 Sexton tells us that Wilderson’s question went something along the lines of: “Is there such a thing- ethically, politically- as radical passivity?”67 Following Wilderson, Sexton asks: “Does it make sense to speak of a need for ‘passivism’ (not to be confused with the homophonic term ‘pacifism’)?”68 Appealing to Zizek’s notion of “passive aggressive behavior” in The Parallax View as well as French philosopher Frédéric Neyrat’s discussion of passivity and politics in his essay “On the Political Unconscious of the Anthropocene,” Sexton explores passivity as a means to envisage or read possibilities that cannot be imagined by the impetuous character of contemporary leftist activism.69 He thus writes:

It’s worth thinking about this [passivity] seriously in the Trump era (using Trump here as a symbol for the consolidation of a whole post-civil rights, postcold war, post 9/11 dispensation), given how greatly the ongoing reactionary campaign benefits from and requires any and all imagery of protest, political or pedestrian, as evidence – “alternative factual evidence” – supporting a narrative, ultimately, of white victimization and oppressive black power (and all the conflictual transliterations of this antagonism seen today– from the land and resource battles in the heartland to the travel bans at the borders). Given, that is, how frustratingly ineffective that protest seems to be in the face of an entire infrastructure that not only absorbs resistance, but solicits it too.70

For Sexton, the certain kind of hyperactivity that constitutes collective rallies and protests is actually solicited by the State. These patterns of public insurgencies are feeding the very discursive and material fabric of increasingly globalized and already racist social, political, and economic regimes. We might think of the BLM, Women’s March, No Dakota Access Pipeline, and Abolish Ice protests as some of these largescale protests targeting the state that have gained significant attention in the media. I do not think Sexton would say these protests are insubstantial or pointless, rather that we might still recognize the important work of large-scale organization through protest while also understanding the ways they nurture a larger system of state-controlled power, thereby re-inscribing state-sponsored necropolitical practices. It is also crucial to note that Sexton is not arguing against (specifically black, queer) rage or violence. Saidiya Hartman is also skeptical of this kind of discourse. “It’s as though in order to come to any recognition of common humanity, the other must be assimilated […] that is the logic of the moral and political discourses we see every day– the need for the innocent black subject to be victimized by a racist state in order to see the racism of the racist state.”71 In other words, the (white) ally requires the (black) subject to be a model of goodness in order to be sympathetic to their position. A passive politics, for Sexton, is not about holding the state accountable through making visible the innocence of the black subject. Rather, Sexton calls on us to reissue the question of what constitutes violence and revolutionary change and success to begin with, challenging the very conventional understanding of political resistance itself.

#### The 1AC is neocon rhetoric aimed at making a mountain out of a molehill. China won’t attack Taiwan.

Cohen '21 [Michael, 11/19/2021, "No, Neocons, China Is Not About to Invade Taiwan," https://newrepublic.com/article/164485/why-china-will-not-invade-taiwan]

One big reason is that Taiwan is about as inhospitable an environment as can be imagined for an amphibious invasion. Ian Easton, a defense expert who has written extensively about Taiwan defense strategy, wrote earlier this year that the country’s “coastal terrain … is a defender’s dream come true. Taiwan has only 14 small invasion beaches, and they are bordered by cliffs and urban jungles.” Easton also notes that “many of Taiwan’s outer islands bristle with missiles, rockets, and artillery guns. Their granite hills have been honeycombed with tunnels and bunker systems.”

A Chinese invasion of Taiwan would look more like the World War II Marine assaults on the rough and unforgiving terrain of Pacific islands than it would D-Day (which was no walk in the park, either) but against an exponentially more competent and technologically advanced military. Even if somehow China were successful in invading Taiwan and occupying the island, it would then find itself in the position of having to pacify and potentially rebuild an advanced nation of 23 million people (two million of whom are members of the nation’s military reserves).

Putting aside the virtually insurmountable military obstacles, there’s the larger issue of how the U.S. and other nations in the region would respond (in recent weeks, Japanese leaders have made clear their determination to help Taiwan in the wake of Chinese invasion). The U.S. could play a decisive role, even without boots on the ground in Taiwan. For example, American naval and air forces could wreak havoc on Chinese supply lines.

As Rachel Esplin Odell and Eric Heginbotham wrote recently in Foreign Affairs (in response to Skylar Mastro): “To seize control of the island, China would need to keep its fleet off Taiwan’s coast for weeks, creating easy targets for antiship cruise missiles launched from Taiwan or from U.S. bombers, fighter aircraft, and submarines.”

Ultimately, no one knows what the U.S. would do in response to a Chinese attack. In recent months, President Biden has twice publicly stated that the U.S. will defend Taiwan, which rhetorically goes so beyond the long-held policy of “strategic ambiguity” that the White House has been forced to walk back his comments. But even if Biden got too far out on his skis, his misstatements create even further confusion for China about U.S. intentions.

Those who are argue that China could invade Taiwan are assuming that Beijing would willingly initiate a conflict that could lead, potentially, to the involvement of the world’s strongest military, backed by thousands of nuclear weapons. Such assumptions throw the entire notion of deterrence on its head.

Lastly, there are the political and financial costs. If China were to attack Taiwan, it would require the mobilization of millions of its citizens and billions, or even trillions, in spending simply to prepare for war. Success would bring with it an even larger price tag for rebuilding Taiwan and integrating the island into China. Anything other than complete military success and acquiescence by the international community would reap an ill wind for Chinese leaders. Economic isolation; interruption of trade ties that have been essential to China’s economic growth over the past two decades; and a generation, if not more, of mistrust and hostility from the U.S., China’s Asian neighbors, and likely the international community would almost certainly be the result.

A Chinese invasion of Taiwan that was anything but a success would likely leave the nation politically isolated, economically damaged, and reputationally crippled. And ironically, a failed attack could lead to a Taiwanese declaration of independence—one that China would be incapable of stopping. All that, at a time when the Chinese economy is facing a collection of economic headwinds—from an energy crunch and a growing real estate crisis to slowing economic growth.

There are other force options available to China’s leaders. The aforementioned Pentagon report notes the potential for an “Air and Maritime Blockade,” “Limited Force or Coercive Options,” and an “Air and Missile Campaign.” But all of these bring with them similar negative political and economic consequences. China could also ramp up the military provocations that have been increasing since 2020, moves that have included Chinese aircraft repeatedly violating Taiwan’s Air Defense Identification Zone and have refuted the existence of a so-called “median line” in the Taiwan Strait. But these moves should be seen in more straightforward terms: an effort to deter Taiwan from taking further steps toward declaring independence.

Those warning of a Chinese invasion would be wise to consider Xi Jingping’s most recent statements about Taiwan. In Beijing’s readout of the meeting this week between Biden and Xi, it states, in regard to Taiwan, “We have patience and will strive for the prospect of peaceful reunification with utmost sincerity and efforts.”

At the same time, the statement makes clear, “Should the separatist forces for Taiwan independence provoke us, force our hands, or even cross the red line, we will be compelled to take resolute measures.”

As M. Taylor Fravel, a professor of political science and director of the Security Studies Program at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, notes, this is consistent with Beijing’s long-standing political-military strategy for Taiwan. “In the simplest terms,” says Fravel, China “seeks to deter Taiwan from declaring independence (and perhaps the U.S. from supporting it), and use military threats toward this end, but not compel unification by force. Military power and interdependence are part of the equation, but they are not the core of the policy that China is now pursuing.” In Fravel’s view, not only are the costs of invading Taiwan high, it’s not Beijing’s “preferred approach for achieving unification.” After all, Fravel notes, “the people of Taiwan are described as ‘compatriots’ and not enemies.”

The U.S. can play a useful role in maintaining the ambiguous status quo. Since 1979, the U.S. has adhered to a “one China” policy, which views Beijing as the sole legitimate government of China. The U.S. would do well to make clear that this policy remains in place, while at the same time maintaining its position of “strategic ambiguity” and discouraging any provocative moves by Taiwan toward independence.

But above all, the Biden administration needs to ignore the alarmist rhetoric of those warning that a Chinese invasion is imminent or even reading too much into China’s provocations. Even if it wanted to, China is not about to invade Taiwan.

### 1NC – Econ

#### Whiteness is an existential threat— (let’s just do the impact debate here)

Preston, 17—Cass School of Education and Communities, University of East London (John, “Rethinking Existential Threats and Education,” Competence Based Education and Training (CBET) and the End of Human Learning pp 61-93, dml)

After Marxism, the second existential threat is one of negation and elimination of the subject and here I shall consider conceptions of this from CRT and black existentialism.

Various contemporary educational theories consider the equity and social justice implications of different forms of education with regard to race. The work of Sleeter and Grant (2007) makes the ethical and pragmatic case for multicultural social justice as a key value of education. This has been followed in contemporary work that attempts to consider the various dimensions of social justice. For example, Bhopal and Shain (2014), consider the twin axis of recognition and redistribution as goals of education. Other work examines the role of social distancing from the ‘Other’ by white students as a dynamic process in which Black, Asian and Minority Ethnic (BAME) and working-class students are disadvantaged. In many ways denial of social justice in terms of lack of resources, recognition or access to social space can be considered to be a form of dehumanisation. However, whilst work on social justice and education might consider the lack of humanity in these systems of oppression (applying concepts such as ‘bare life’, Lewis 2006; or ‘othering’ Lebowitz 2016) they do not consider directly existential threats. Threats to humanity on the basis of difference may arise from totalitarianism as much as through war and threats to the environment. The various genocides which have taken place throughout human history have often had a racial, or ethnic, cleansing purpose to them. They have been eugenic threats that are based upon spurious ideas of genetic and moral superiority. Writers on race from Fanon to Du Bois have considered that the threat posed to racial groups may be existential and that there is a short step from psychic, to real extermination. The negation of individuals through economic, social and psychological processes allows for their physical extermination. Du Bois (2014) deals explicitly with existential threat in his short story ‘The Comet’ where humanity is almost wiped out by a threat from space, leaving only a small number of people to carry on. As one of the survivors of the comet is an African American, this leads Du Bois to consider the state of race relations in the USA. The implication of the story is that the existential threat of the comet (which allows the African American character to live in a world entirely free of racial prejudice) allows release from the existential threat of eugenic attitudes. Building on Du Bois, in other work (Preston 2012), I have considered the ways in which preparation for threats, including existential threats such as pandemics and nuclear war, has been in many ways eugenic in that it prioritises the survival of some more than others based upon criteria which include race and ethnicity (Preston 2012). Preparing for disasters and emergencies often prioritises the interests of white people above those of other ethnic minorities. One reason for this is tacit intentionality which means that policymakers and practitioners do not consider human diversity in considering how people may respond to disaster. Policy is often biased as policymakers expect that people will be ‘like me’ which (at least in the UK and USA) means they will often be white, middle-class, educated, English-speaking men. In planning for threats, there will be various ways in which such biases are included. For example, they may not consider publishing advice in a number of languages, the resources necessary to survive a disaster, the mobility of people and the attitudes of emergency responders. This is unwitting prejudice in that by not considering diversity they are actually making it less likely for BAME people to survive, or protect themselves against, the disaster.

Although these biases may lead to a gradient in terms of survival by different groups in a disaster, they do not appear to relate to existential threat. However, existential threat can be interpreted in a different way in perspectives from critical whiteness studies and CRT.

In critical whiteness studies, whiteness is taken to be not a racial identity, but rather a system of power and oppression (Leonardo 2009). Whiteness was created as an identity not simply as a mode of social classification but as a way of exploiting and controlling others. There are obviously periods in history where this was objectively the case. During slavery in the USA, for example, whiteness was used as a means to distinguish between those people who had the right to own property (whites) and those who could not (Africans), Moreover, whiteness was the obverse of property in that only Africans could ‘be’ assets or property. Enslaved Africans were therefore treated as property and did not have access to the basic rights which would constitute humanity in American society (such as access to education, the right to own property, the right to decide who they should have relationships with). There are obviously parallels between this experience and holocaust when Jewish people (and other individuals) were dehumanised by the Nazis and denied access to basic resources. During imperialism there was also a period whereby other races were categorised to be less worthy than white people and this provided the justification for colonial control, exploitation and often extermination.

Advocates of whiteness studies go further than this and consider that whiteness is not merely a past system of oppression, but a continuing system of white supremacy (Leonardo 2009). The economy and society is comprised in such a way that white people will usually benefit, and BAME people will usually not. This is not only an economic and social system but also a psychological system whereby existence as a full human depends upon one’s racial categorisation. This idea has its roots in the work of Fanon (1986) who wrote that black identity was shaped by the white gaze, but also contemporary writers also consider the notion of whiteness as ‘death’, a categorisation that is rooted in past oppression and extermination, whose remnants exist to this day. This perspective on race and existence leads us to consider what is meant by life, and whether we are not currently living to our full potential (as Marxists would also propose) when existential threat is actually amongst us. For Marxists this would be the expansion of the ‘social universe’ of capitalism that flows between and through us, ‘capitalising humanity’. For critical whiteness studies, this existential threat would be one of whiteness and the negation of existence for a racially classified group of people.

In order to make this idea of constant existential threat more tangible (although the term is not used) critical race theorists use what are known as ‘counter-stories’ to consider how racial dynamics might develop in the future, or to highlight inequalities in the present (Delgado 1996). Derrick Bell (1992) who is considered to be the founder of CRT, uses a much cited counter-story ‘The Space Traders’ to consider the ways in which black people’s lives are classed as being not equal to those of whites in the USA. In ‘The Space Traders’ a race of aliens offer the USA a trade: all of America’s black citizens in return for unlimited, environmentally friendly, energy and technology. After some debate, the American people vote on the proposal and decide to give up all of America’s black citizens to the space traders in return for the futuristic technical goods. Of course, Bell is proposing an analogy between slavery in the past and the present situation of black people in the USA, and perhaps even suggesting that such a thing might happen again. On another level, though, there is also the idea that the existence of black people in America is categorised at a different level of metaphysical worth to that of white people. That life could be traded so cheaply, even plausibly (in the thought experiment) makes us pause for thought in terms of how we classify existential threat.

Although the relationship between CRT and black existentialism may not always seem obvious we can see that there is a nihilistic streak in the work of Bell (1992) with regard to the prospects for survival. In addition, the drawing on the work of Fanon by authors who use CRT as part of their work which shows the perpetual violence encountered by people of colour in education as well as the enduring influence of Du Bois on CRT (Delgado and Stefancic 2001) shows the close connection between the two theories. What links CRT and black existentialism is a basic concern with existence and the meaning of human life under constant threat that can be thought to underpin any concern with social justice. From CRT and black existentialism, we therefore see that existential threat is one of negation through economic, social and political systems and there are degrees of graduation between these forms of existential threats and actual genocide or extermination. The links between these points and CBET might be considered as obtuse but, as we shall see in the next chapter, systems of education can play a role in forms of negation. Obviously, there are social justice implications in the way in which people are treated in terms of race and ethnicity in education. The ‘triaging’ by race and ethnicity of access to education courses, the ways in which certain groups are rationed access to educational routes and the fragility of links between education and the labour market for BAME groups are all part of marginalisation, in which vocational education plays a large part. As part of this process, and probably not coincidentally, these groups are also more likely to find themselves in vocational, CBET courses. However, social justice is not the whole story, and there is a more profound form of equality associated with the right to existence. It is this that CBET threatens through the reduction of the subject to a digital organism as I will show in the next chapter.

#### The presumption that markets can be post-racial as a matter of inclusion is an attempt to efface history and rescue race from blackness, located as absent relationality or agency.

Dumas 13 (Michael J., Assistant Professor at the University of California, Berkeley in the Graduate School of Education and the African American Studies Department, “’Waiting for Superman’ to save black people: racial representation and the official antiracism of neoliberal school reform,” Discourse: Studies in the Cultural Politics of Education, 34:4, 2013)

The rise of neoliberalism in the 1980s and 1990s shifted the relationship between governmentality and race; while in earlier periods, the state positioned itself as the leader in advancing antiracism, under neoliberal multiculturalism , it is neoliberal economic policies and ideological formations that are seen to resolve the problem of racism. The market, in this hegemonic frame, knows neither race nor racism, and is therefore regarded as best suited to facilitate racial equality. Neoliberal multiculturalism promises to usher in the post-racial period, by nurturing a new global citizenship centered around economic participation. ‘ In short ’ , Melamed contends, ‘neoliberal multiculturalism has portrayed an ethic of multiculturalism to be the spirit of neoliberalism ’ (p. 42). In doing so, neoliberal multiculturalism abandons any explicit mention of race. While liberal multiculturalism employed discourses of equity, diversity and freedom, ‘ now open societies and economic freedoms ... and consumerist diversity signify multicultural rights for individuals and for corporations ’ (p. 43; italics in original). Neoliberal multiculturalism is still attentive to racial difference and recognizes inequitable outcomes, but explains these differences as essentially not about race or (in) justice, but individual and group choices. As Melamed explains: Neoliberal-multicultural racialization has made this disparity appear fair by ascribing racialized privilege to neoliberalism ’ s beneficiaries and racialized stigma to its dispossessed. In particular, it has valued its beneficiaries as multicultural, reasonable, law-abiding, and good global citizens and devalued the dispossessed as monocultural, backward, weak, and irrational – unfit for global citizenship because they lack the proper neoliberal subjectivity. ( 2009 , p. 44) In contrast to black stigmatization under liberal multiculturalism, here the focus is on the distance between black subjects and the market. Through the neoliberal-multicultural lens, we can still feel sympathy to the extent that these subjects are perceived as being prevented from participating in the market. However, if they reject opportunities to participate in the market, no matter how rigged that system may be, then our sympathies can be justifiably withheld. Any argument that the economic sphere is already regulated by racial privilege will fall on deaf ears, as the market is already presumed to be multicultural and racially ethical (i.e. post -racial) on its face. I want to suggest that, even in a neoliberal-multicultural period, we can still identify elements of racial liberalism and liberal multiculturalism. History is never erased or transcended; dimensions of the previous periods are evident in our national-racial imagination and in the racial representations that inform and are informed by that imagination. Waiting for Superman as a cultural and political product Near the beginning of Waiting for Superman (Guggenheim, 2010 ), Harlem Children ’ s Zone founder and so-called education ‘ reformer ’ , Geoffrey Canada, recalls his childhood disappointment in learning that Superman is not real. ‘ Even in the depth of the ghetto ’ ,he explains to the off-camera interviewer, ‘ you thought, he ’ s coming. I just don ’ t know when, because he always shows up and he saves all the good people ’ . As he speaks, images of a young Canada fade to black, interspersed with images of George Reeves as the hero in tights in the 1950s TV series, Adventures of Superman : I asked my mom, do you think Superman is – she said, Superman is not real ... and I said, what do you mean, he ’ s not real? And she thought I was crying because it ’ s like, Santa Claus is not real, and I was crying because there was no one coming with enough power to save us. In inspiring the title of the controversial documentary, Canada presents an image of a poor urban black community without a sense of hope, innocent but helpless in the face of social, economic and spatial marginalization. A people in need of a savior, the young black boy reckons, would do well to appeal for help to the ultimate all-American (white) superhero. Here, his city neighborhood becomes constructed as an uninhabitable jungle (Leonardo & Hunter, 2007 ). Unlike in some rightist interpretations, the black residents of Canada ’ s ghetto are not to blame for their condition, but instead are victims of something unnamed, a tragic historical accident. Blameless, they earn our sympathies; however, they clearly do not have enough agencies to help themselves. Or as Canada suggests, poor African Americans are so far gone, their salvation may require someone with superhuman powers. The producers of Waiting for Superman use Canada ’ s childhood memory to frame the film ’ s heartbreaking, liberal racial narrative, in which racial inequities are bemoaned without any acknowledgment of racism, (good) people of color eschew collectivist racial politics, and black subjects in particular are quick to point out their own personal moral and emotional failures as the cause of their own low educational aspirations and attainment. Waiting for Superman is significant as a cultural and political product, because it has been largely embraced by corporate education reformers like wealthy philanthropists Bill Gates and Eli Broad, and because of its harsh critique of teacher unions and uncritical praise for private educational-entrepreneurial ventures like KIPP and Teach for America. Although the film generated a massive critical response from academics and progressive education advocates (see, for example, http://www.notwaitingforsuperman.org ), it enjoyed a generally sympathetic and often enthusiastic response everywhere else, from glowing newspaper and magazine stories, to favorable coverage by influential media personalities like Oprah Winfrey and Katie Couric. Waiting for Superman is also important, because it is perhaps the most influential popular-discursive effort to advance a new managerialism in education reform. Manage- rialism, as Michael Apple ( 2006 ) explains is led by an emerging group of middle-class professionals committed to using business models of profit, competition and efficiency to ‘ reform ’ education (and other public institutions and functions). This entails privatizing some schools, and financially and politically undermining remaining public institutions, which are then forced to compete with these marketized schools. Ultimately, then, the argument can be made that private entities can more effectively deliver services that have previously been understood as public, as part of our collective responsibility for the public good. Managerialism is ‘ an ideal project ’ , Apple contends, ‘ merging the language of empowerment, rational choice, efficient organization, and new roles for managers all at the same time ’ (p. 25). Waiting for Superman is, in effect, a managerialist manifesto for education in the United States. What we learn in examining racial representations in the film is exactly how mangerialism aims to win for the rightist project a certain innocence vis à vis racism, and more, a sense that racial progress depends on adopting conservative ideology and reform policies. The story arc of Waiting for Superman , its primary suspense, centers on a competitive public lottery system in which children and their families vie for a severely limited number of student spots in highly-regarded charter schools. It is The Hunger Games in reverse; here, those not selected are presumed to be the unfortunate ones, condemned to suffering and abuse, while the masses watch. And like that blockbuster motion picture, Waiting for Superman is a cultural product, not simply a documentation of truth, or policy, or everyday life. The filmmakers construct a dramatic plot, with messages embedded in the images and also made explicit in the text. We meet the families, hear them share their struggles and dreams, and explain what they believe accounts for their own educational and/or social marginality. The filmmakers intend to evoke enough sympathy that as the film comes to its dramatic final scenes, we are emotionally invested in the outcome, anxious to discover if the students will be offered admission, as the number of still available seats becomes smaller and smaller. In most cases, the families experience crushing disappointment, which allows opportunities for wrenching close-ups of terrified eyes, tear-stained cheeks, and hands still clenching strips of paper with losing numbers. To a great degree, the filmmakers need, perhaps the audience too needs, or at least desires, to see suffering. Not only does it help the filmmakers make their argument about the state of public education, but it is also better theater, more compelling entertainment. Ultimately, our own humanity is affirmed, because we care so much about these strangers on the screen. In one particularly moving scene, we see a Latina mother, Maria, touring a Harlem charter school where she hopes her first-grade son, Francisco, will win a spot, to escape his low-resourced school in the South Bronx. Maria is clearly impressed with the resources of the charter school, and looks longingly at the warm, inviting classrooms. ‘ I don ’ t care if we have to wake up at 5 o ’ clock in the morning in order to get there at 7:45 ’ , she says, almost plaintively. ‘ That ’ s what we will do ’ . But, as the New York Times later reported (Otterman, 2010 ), when this scene was filmed, Maria already knew that Francisco would not get to attend this school. The scene was staged after the lottery, in order to ‘ see her reaction to the school, and her genuine emotion ’ , according to director Davis Guggenheim. For him, the scene was ‘ real ’ because the pain and longing in her eyes revealed her excitement about the possibility of having her son attend the charter school, although it might also be argued that they exploited her pain for their own purposes. It is certainly not uncommon for documentary filmmakers to re-enact and re-order scenes; my point here is to underscore that Waiting for Superman is produced , and produced in ways which evoke not only specific emotions, but produce and reproduce certain cultural discourses and ideological formations. As a racial cultural product, the film provides images of racialized bodies and differences that seem natural largely because they draw upon the familiar or the popular, that which we already accept about race, and more specifically here, blackness. As Herman Gray ( 2005 ) explains, ‘ the movement of black images and representation is never free of cultural and social traces of the condition of their production, circulation, and use ’ (p. 21). Hence, what I want to highlight in my analysis of the film is the ways in which black social actors take their (expected) place within the broader ideological conditions of official antiracisms – speaking, gazing and even moving on screen in support of that grander narrative. As I have hinted, if not said explicitly thus far, neoliberal multiculturalism, in conjunction with managerialism, brings an inherent effort to move beyond the black- white racial paradigm. This is more than an acknowledgment of a fuller plane of racial diversity, but an ideological position in which ‘ black ’ is understood as anachronistic, passé and a threat to national progress. Jared Sexton ( 2008 ) is worth quoting at length: Modernizing the nation – at least the segment of the nation with the potential to be ‘ more than black ’ or simply to move ‘ beyond black ’– and liberating it from the deadening weight of the past requires that the signature of its persistence ... be effaced. In this light, multiracialism can be read ... as an element of the ascendant ideology of colorblindness, but it is not thereby identical to it. Its target is not race per se, since multiracialism is still very much a politics of racial identity ... but rather the categorical sprawl of blackness in particular and the insatiable political demand it presents to a nominally postemancipation society. ( 2008 ,p.6) Neoliberal multiculturalism, or what Sexton calls multiracialism, seeks to rescue racial identity from blackness, which is seen as largely responsible for giving race its offensive and oppositional signification. The neoliberal-multicultural cultural product, then, finds effective ways to situate blackness and black bodies as absent of rationality or agency, and black racial politics an ineffective explanation of, or solution to persistent racial inequity. I am not suggesting that there is a direct line between racial representation and racial intent. That is, my aim is not to provide evidence that the film is racist, or that the filmmakers were motivated by racism. Rather, my argument is that the film was produced, and enters a field of already existing cultural productions, in which race and blackness have already been and continue to be imagined discursively, and in which black bodies are situated materially, disproportionately among the poorest and least regarded. What becomes important and potentially destructive about Waiting for Superman is the extent to which its representations reproduce and reify antiblack imaginations, ideologies and sentiments, even as the filmmakers claim to have offered a cultural product – an officially antiracist cultural product – that advocates for poor black people and other marginalized racial groups.

#### Their invocation of economic catastrophe obliterates black life by narratively cohering it within a linear temporality of progress.

Agathangelou, 21—Associate Professor, Department of Politics, York University (Anna, “On the question of time, racial capitalism, and the planetary,” Globalizations, 18:6, 880-897, dml) [brackets in original]

Physicists, spiritual leaders, and theorists argue ‘time is not real’ (Martin, 2020; Rovelli, 2018). It is a ‘human construct … to help us differentiate between now and our perception of the past’ (Martin, 2020). As a meaning that human groups have given to change (Tabboni, 2001), it organizes our systems of thought and our everyday lives. Time has special meaning in politics, where ‘the very distinction between truth and fiction has been made redundant’ so that ‘the criterion is no longer accuracy – it’s conformity to the needs of the moment’ (Klein, 2014; emphasis added). Our present analytical and political challenge is to grapple with the ways time is entangled with the ‘needs of the moment’ in areas of energy and climate change. Yet the politics of the ecological require understanding time. Notions like succession, simultaneity, duration, urgency, waiting, speed, geological revolutions, money, and death are expressions of time and are entangled with the ecological and its models of development.

The increasing risks to the environment as a result of the extraction of conventional oil and natural gas resources and the increased greenhouse emissions have led to what the experts have called the climate crisis. Yet as Klein says, ‘despite being convinced of the necessity of addressing our behavior as regards energy consumption, collective consciousness appears at once paralyzed and indecisive … frozen in the face of the obstacle’ (Klein, 2014). Instead of frozen time, Bourriaud points to the acceleration of time and what this has wrought: ‘the great acceleration also lies within the process of the naturalization of capitalism: now it has become both organic and universal, it is the natural law of the Anthropocene’ (cited in Chiambaretta, 2017). Mbembe (2021) expands this argument of the relations of time with the planetary by arguing the politics and aesthetics of the ecological require understanding the coloniality of power and its contemporary temporal mutations. Imperial expansion, Mbembe argues, was (is) a planetary project driven by nationalist states and companies to reallocate the earth’s resources through military might and privatization. Colonial epistemes and practices of time block the potentiality and affirmation of a planetary beyond capture and conquest (Marriott, 2011) but national decolonization cannot be ‘what gives deep breathing for the world’ (Mbembe, 2021). Some physicists speak of ‘eternity in relation to time’, wherein ‘atoms and the emptiness of the universe are infinite, uncreated, and imperishable’ (Oestreicher, 2012, p. 435). Others speak of chronological and cyclical time, attributing the first to the West and the latter to the East. Newton (1643–1727) defined time as a mathematical variable with one dimension. The only two ‘topological objects with this characteristic’ are a ‘line and a circle … . It thus follows that time is either infinite or cyclic’ (Oestreicher, 2012, p. 436). Grappling with the question of social death, Frank Wilderson argues that assembling black life into a series of historical events, into a narrative with a plot ‘is a catastrophe for narrative at a meta-level rather than a crisis or aporia within a particular narrative’ (Wilderson, 2015b). For him,

narrative time … marks stasis and change within a [human] paradigm, [but] it does not mark the time of the [human] paradigm, the time of time itself, the time by which the slave’s dramatic clock is set. For the slave, historical ‘time’ is not possible. (Wilderson, 2010, p. 339)

In this article I engage with two dominant logics1 and grammars of time,2 modernity, capitalism, and ecology: time as linear, flowing in a particular direction (determined sequencing separable in measurable units), and time as retrojection, defined as ‘a kind of projection that retrospectively testifies to ‘what comes before’’ (Walker, 2012, p. 268) or after.3 Examining how these two ideas of time become central to the co-production of the planetary as a colonial and imperial project will allow a structural engagement with the emergence and generation of the conditions for decolonial planetary relations as acts of invention (Fanon, 1967; Marriott, 2014).

A Caribbean slave proverb, ‘time is longer dan rope’, challenges the dominant notion of linear time and progress. The state and corporations continue to expropriate black lives and indigenous lands, thus ‘extract[ing] surplus from various processes of social and ecological reproduction’ (McGee & Greiner, 2020), including the obliteration of lives. These structures of death are taken for granted, including the colonial linear structures of progress and growth, their contingent epistemic edifices and the privileges that shape and enable social and ecological reproduction.

Generally speaking, temporal boundaries are drawn to render climate change or ecological crisis theorizable within certain fields, such as environmental, governance, and conservation studies. However, that which is ‘inside’ or embodies a temporal trajectory connotes what is present in the economy, while the ‘outside’ connotes a void (without time). Rather than seeing contemporary readers as always irrevocably distanced from such events, if those who write on climate change focus the language of time, they may open up new possibilities for bringing to the fore substantial structures whose temporality or lived experience is occluded or does not even register as time. In fact, the pervasive tapestries of violence and their temporal structures are challenged by theorists of black thought, indigenous studies, postcolonialism, and Fanonian studies (Rifkin 2017; Wilderson 2015a, 2015b, 2016; Fanon, 1967). They challenge historical and linear time, orienting the reader toward a reality that is neither graspable nor conquerable but a flickering reality of sensed and unsensed ‘actualities, the moment under the moment’ (Hoban, 1992). They problematize easy readings of structures and dominant systems of thought and their entanglement with notions of time, and they query the collective amnesia of temporal productions and the racial capitalist-enslaving-colonial global order where, on the one hand, things are written on water and evaporate (Shafak, 2014, p. 2) and, on the other, certain ecologies and lives are dead on arrival.

Modernist nationalist and capitalist iterations of time focus on linear teleologies/eschatologies. This orientation of the temporal operates through causality, stories of progress and growth, the plausible and possible, and ideas about movement from past to present to future and evolution (Wilk, 2007). However, another orientation, retrojection, I argue, is vital to racial ecological capitalism’s dominant power. Without engaging with both of these structures and operation of time simultaneously, we cannot understand power and its entanglements with the planetary. The temporality of capital’s projection retrospectively testifies to what comes before its current organizing. Retrojection requires us to ‘relocate ourselves into the past’, while ‘assigning purposes and ends to [such] actions’ (Motzkin, 1992) as well as a mythical agency to capital. These two expressions of temporality co-exist, at times in tension. They are inflected in our institutions and our social life.

In this piece, I look at the structure of time and ecology to trace how social sciences, humanities, and natural sciences draw on such structures to colonize, enslave, and imperialize the planetary. I trace how and when time and temporality bound the Anthropocene. The search is not for a start date but for the ways the ‘date’ or the ‘when’ is a political, economic, scientific, and ethical question (Davis & Todd, 2017, p. 761; Rifkin 2017; Whyte, 2017; Saldanha, 2020) entangled with the structure of time and what Fanon calls the invention or new beginning beyond global capital’s projects. I draw on a 2018 report from the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) and work by Naomi Oreskes and Erik M. Conway to register the co-production of the temporal with ‘the domains of nature, facts, objectivity, reason … policy [and] culture, values, subjectivity, emotions and politics’ (Jasanoff, 2004, p. 12).4 I use these works as a springboard for thinking how this temporal co-production expresses the tension between the reproduction of capital and the generation of life. To conclude the piece, in conversation with Octavia E. Butler, I suggest instead of dreading an impending crisis, we should read radically for the ruptures in the dominant structures of time (i.e. in narratives, dialectics, etc.) (Marriott, 2011; Wilderson, 2010) and their entanglement with questions of the planetary and climate change. Such fractal readings may yield insights into possible disinvestment from the fossil economy and open up the possibility for an indeterminate world, the passionate and living experimenting with and harnessing of the flux of energy into a vision of a decolonial whose basic premise is not conquest and enslavement.

Liberalism: always too late, or capitalism’s colonial and enslaving proactivity?

In the IPCC reports, time as a linear human orientation is placed in the context of timescales of forces requiring human intervention but out of human control: climate change. The recent SRl.5 (IPCC, 2018), ‘Global Warming of 1.5°C’, representing the ‘newer instalment of the scientisation of climate change’, situates ‘the issue beyond democratic debate by declaring it a matter for the scientific expertise of the IPCC’, and inscribes it as an emergency (Garrard, 2020, p. 1). The report suggests ‘climate change is moving faster than we are’ (Masson-Delmotte et al., 2018, p. v), and its urgency demands our intervention. However, the moral and ethical articulation of the climate as a linear temporal ‘urgency’ does not allow us to understand ecological shifts or even climate change in a larger trajectory, including human conquest, property relations, and competition. Rather, the report’s ‘foreshortened timeframe’ speaks to the urgent need of global concerted efforts to mitigate climate change and signals how temporary responses and procrastination are not going to do the trick (Garrard, 2020, p. 2).

John Mecklin, Editor of Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, similarly reminds us that time is running out:

Faced with this daunting threat landscape and a new willingness of political leaders to reject the negotiations and institutions that can protect civilization over the long term, the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists Science and Security Board today moves the Doomsday Clock 20 s closer to midnight - closer to apocalypse than ever. (Mecklin, 2020)

The moving of the clock makes the ‘climate emergency’ public, especially for those proponents of liberalism whose ‘macroscopic exclusion clauses’ have been written to ‘displace … unfreedom’ onto all marginalized, enslaved, and colonized peoples and those ‘primitive’ and ‘undeveloped’ sites ‘from a white male bourgeois European who was the historical agent in the narrative’ (Mann, 2019). Yet this moving of the clock does not address the root of the problem. It allows the positing of a secular/humanist eschatological story (Rothe, 2020, p. 162) whose temporal structure is one of immanent destruction, informed by an analysis of existence as being-towards-death (i.e. of the human and the planet) or catastrophe.

Of course, this schematic presumes death and ecological catastrophe (collapsed into one). It represents a never-reached horizon of experience, where authentic and moral decisions must be made through a theory or ‘concept of crisis or emergency’ (Mann, 2019). Liberal leaders of the international political system ‘inch toward’ an implementation of a regulatory system, what Mann and Wainwright call climate Leviathan, instead of addressing the root causes of global warming. These leaders are not creative but ‘fumble … for solutions’, continuing to argue that ‘climate change’ is a ‘market failure, without considering the limiting structures of the ‘market’ itself (Osaka, 2019, p. 2; citing Mann & Wainwright, 2018). When the moment for organized challenge emerges, white hegemony rushes to squander the creative energy and reorients social relations toward its consolidation. It does so by rushing to innovate through the co-production of narratives and an emerging ecological order.

The present as a fracture of notions of history and ‘historical natures’

Apocalypse is ‘the single most powerful master metaphor that the contemporary environmental imagination has at its disposal’ (Buell, 1995, p. 285). As such, it deranges capital and its entanglements with ecological problems, ranging from the climate change, to the extinction of species, the loss of pollinating insects, and other ecological disasters. These challenges or this ecology of environmental concerns cannot be considered in a partitioned manner.

The focus on temporality has been picked up by historians and others grappling with what the authors of the Anthropocene name a crisis and emergency. One text that speaks to the global climate change as apocalyptic temporality is Oreskes and Conway’s The Collapse of Western Civilization. In theorizing the present and the temporal possibilities for the future otherwise, these authors open the door for us to experiment with what Sheila Jasanoff and Sang-Hyun call sociotechnical imaginaries (2013). The book’s narrator is a Chinese historian in the year 2393. The historian says Western civilization possessed robust information about climate change and the ‘damaging events to unfold’ but was ‘unable to stop’ them (Oreskes & Conway, 2014, p. x, pp. 1-2), thus ‘condemning their successors to the inundation and desertification of the late twenty-first and twentysecond centuries’ (Oreskes & Conway, 2014, pp. 59–60). A second Dark Age descended, and the Period of Penumbra began. The present ignorance, the historian says, is a result of an ‘ideological fixation on ‘free’ markets; another compartmentalization and the practice among the scientific community of demanding an excessively stringent standard for accepting claims of any kind, even those involving imminent threats’ (Oreskes & Conway, 2014, pp. ix-x). In a sense, this future scenario tells nothing about the future and more about the ‘present’ – our moment.

However, the narrator’s historical account is problematic and, as Garrard argues ‘unequivocably dangerous’, as the scenario focuses on ‘catastrophic outcomes’ (Garrard, 2020, p. 3). Gallard’s critique is important to our discussion of temporality. Narrating the present as a given history evades uncertainty and possibilities for the world as a project beyond global capital. In a sense, this dystopian temporality posits itself as the ‘truth’ of our reality as if punctuating a certain kind of imaginary temporal orientation – the only one about the future. This depicted history anticipates the failure of the future by drawing on assembled empirics and technologies of problem-solving as if failure and the future are not up for debate (Jasanoff, 2019), as if the historical codes and genre choices that assemble these dystopia future scenarios are not ‘originary’ to the familiar narratives of history which they ground.

In highlighting that the Anthropocene is actually a ‘liberal managerial term’, Mann (2019) suggests the ideology of liberalism distorts the multiple social reproductions of violence and strategies of failure by sublimating them through temporal means, deploying concepts such as crises, emergencies, and exceptions, and substituting adaptation for progress. We see this in scientific reports, for example, the SRl.5 and others; while they address the metabolic rifts and shifts, they still use the Anthropocene as the social contract (Mann, 2019). In Climate Leviathan, Joel Wainwright and Geoff Mann argue crisis, risk, and uncertainty are asymmetrical, the result of the actions of a minority of humanity, i.e. the white male bourgeois European who claims the agency and writing of the historical narrative of liberalism and imperial capitalism. The Anthropocene is a technology co-productive of temporal regimes of modernity and the planetary order:

[The Anthropocene is] an explicitly future facing instrument of temporal power. Like all contracts, it restarts time on its terms. The distribution of responsibilities it represents is always also the closure of supersession of past arrangements. So, a contract that has no expiration, like a constitution or the Anthropocene, is supposed to mark the end of the past and the beginning of a new time. (Mann & Wainwright, 2018, p. 8)

The Anthropocene is itself a technology of temporal power which orders and organizes social life. In questioning this contract, Mann and Wainwright problematize how time is used to organize global power. They question whether the idea that the Anthropocene marks the end of the past as many claim and the beginning of a new time is accurate. For them, this fetishization of the Anthropocene evades the intensifying challenges to the world. The structure of ‘transition’ of the contemporary global order and the production of history of liberalism as progress (Mann & Wainwright, 2018, p. 9) are problematic and do not acknowledge how such kinds of politics are co-produced with a structure of transcendental time as their major procedural technology of governance. The transformation of the world’s political economy and the fundamental political arrangements most people take for granted thus need to be engaged on the register of the language of temporal power and the global order.

#### Liberal peace is inseparable from the violent façade of liberal pacification which obscures the escalating cycle of phenomenological violence at the heart of the world order that kills value to life and ensures nuclear war

Baron, et al, 19—Associate Professor in the School of Government and International Affairs at Durham University (Ilan Zvi, with Jonathan Havercroft, Associate Professor in International Political Theory at the University of Southampton, Isaac Kamola, assistant professor of political science at Trinity College, Jonneke Koomen, Associate Professor of Politics, Sociology and Women’s and Gender Studies at Willamette University, Alex Prichard, senior lecturer in International Relations at the University of Exeter, and Justin Murphy, anticlimactically just an independent scholar, “Liberal Pacification and the Phenomenology of Violence,” International Studies Quarterly (2019) 63, 199–212, dml) [ableist language modifications denoted by brackets]

Phenomenology, as we are using it, is not about lived experience. It is the philosophical tradition of revealing different types of beings and things that contain meaning in our world, the structures and/or contexts in which they exist, and how these structures and contexts are meaningful. Understood in this way, violence is one of these structures and/or contexts. A phenomenological perspective does not approach violence from a particular normative position, although it does not preclude normative critique. A phenomenological approach does not treat violence as a discrete thing that one agent does to another, although it does not preclude such acts being described as violent. Instead, a phenomenological perspective adds to our intellectual and methodological toolbox by identifying violence as a condition or context in which people function. Phenomenology allows us to identify violence occurring in ways and in places that we otherwise would not be able to recognize. It does not change the meaning of violence (as harm, for example). Instead, it treats violence ontologically, enabling us to reveal more accurately the extent to which violence exists in the world.

From a phenomenological perspective, violence is often inconspicuous. Violence can function as a naturalized or internalized regime of compulsion or domination. Pacification reveals both the pervasiveness of violence and forms of violence that may otherwise remain inconspicuous. The erasing of tradition and the enforcement of particular legal codes at the expense of indigenous cultural norms is one example of an inconspicuous form of violence that involves conspicuous and inconspicous consequences (Cocks 2014). In understanding violence phenomenologically, as a structure of revealing across multiple worlds, we are better able to reveal the extent to which violence shapes our world and how we are then shaped by violence.

Pacavere

The Romans understood violence as a necessary condition for pax. The liberal imagination blinds itself to [obfuscates] the ways that pacification functions as violence in our world order. International relations scholarship’s strict distinction between peace and violence reinforces this obfuscation. Yet, the violence of (and in) pacification is central to the contemporary world. A phenomenological approach shows that moments of violent rupture are not aberrations of the world order. Violent outbreaks are breakdowns of pacification. It follows that multiple structures of the world order function as the violence of pacification, of pacavere.12 These structures include liberal capitalism, colonialism and the postcolonial aftermath, and war. Each functions as a key site of pacification. Anarchist thought reveals the pacification in liberal capitalism. Postcolonial thought reveals the pacification of colonial projects. Both anarchist and postcolonial thought demonstrate how war is a breakdown of pacification, revealing the hidden violent structures of our worldhood.

Anarchist critiques of capitalism, unlike Marxist and liberal interpretations, take seriously the decisive role of state violence in structuring society and markets. Anarchists view the state as an institution that sustains elite appropriations of political and economic power (Proudhon [1861] 1998; Sorel 1999; Prichard 2015). Those at the bottom of the social hierarchy bear the costs of this enforced order. The state diffuses violence (pacification) throughout the entire society—often in ways that go unrecognized by its subjects (Sorel 1999, 65). The naturalization of violence consolidates arbitrary regimes of domination in society. While specific, countable incidents of violence may decline, the social order is largely premised on the threat of violence for contravening social norms making specific, countable incidents of violence relatively rare (Kinna and Prichard, forthcoming).

Anarchist thinkers view rising inequality in the context of declining riots, insurgencies, and assassinations (see Figure 1) as evidence of pacification. Incidents of proletarian violence, anticolonial violence, riots, and protests are all examples of resistance to the “regimes of domination” that shape contemporary society, regimes easily identifiable by those subject to them (Gordon 2007, 33). Drawing on these accounts, we interpret declining rates of riots as a sign of increased pacification, rather than evidence that the system is becoming less violent. Conversely, eruptions of antistate and anticapitalist direct violence are signs of a breakdown in pacification. Much like Heidegger’s example of broken equipment (1962, 102–3, 412–13), which draws our attention to the background structures of our world, brief instances of direct violence reveal violently structured social relations.

Although the liberal imagination obscures the centrality of violence, violence has always been central to the liberal world order—to the liberal worldhood—particularly during the colonial and imperial projects of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries (Bell 2007a, 2007b). Colonial violence was diffused throughout the entire society, often in ways that went unrecognized by the colonized themselves. The violence of pacification structured the very existence of the colonized subject. This violence transformed the colonized subjects into a different “species” (Fanon 1963, 35– 40, 43). Colonial pacification was more than direct and indirect violence; it was sufficiently diffuse to remake the psyche of the colonized, affecting their mental health and emotions (Fanon 1963, 35–106). Fanon (1963, 31) described it as “atmospheric violence,” a “violence rippling under the skin.” Unable to lash out against the colonizer, the colonized lived everyday within a world ordered by violence. In this world, the colonized could not respond to the colonizers for fear of directly violent reprisals and would turn to symbolic activities such as a dance circle to expose the violence experienced on a daily basis (Fanon 1963, 57). For the colonized, rituals such as the dance were a means of expressing existential frustrations with and resistance to the violence of colonial pacification through reenactments of direct violence. Ultimately, anticolonial struggles exposed the violence of colonialism by directing that violence back on its authors.

Practices of colonial rule were central to developing liberal norms of sovereignty, as well as to the domination and control of recalcitrant populations whether within Europe, such as the English domination of the Welsh, Irish, and Scots, or outside of Europe by settler colonialists against indigenous populations (Deloria Jr 1974; Anghie 2005; Miller 2006; Havercroft 2008; Shaw 2008; Barkawi and Stanski 2012; Coulthard 2014; Simpson 2014; Lightfoot 2016; Rueda-Saiz 2017). This civilizing imagination functioned phenomenologically. It produced insiders as civilized and peaceful and outsiders as violent, external threats to civilization. In doing so, this imagination successfully obscured how the structures of liberalism produced colonial violence.13

FOOTNOTE 13 Arguments about the foundational role of colonialism, primitive accumulation, and white supremacy in structuring the modern international system are particularly useful in thinking about phenomenological violence (Jones 2006; Anievas, Manchanda, and Shilliam 2015; Du Bois 1915; Shaw 2008; Coulthard 2014; Deloria 1974; Lowe 2015; Hartman 1997). The legacy of these practices pervades contemporary liberal peace-building (Richmond 2014; Sabaratnam 2015; Bouka 2013; Autesserre 2009) and liberal global governance (Koomen 2014a, 2014b, 2013), while trade liberalization can facilitate mass violence (Kamola 2007; Smith 2016). Césaire argues that colonialism produced a “boomerang effect” within European societies; Nazism was the return of violence previously “applied only to non-European peoples” (Césaire 2000, 36). At independence, international law became a mechanism for reinforcing this international order upon the previously colonized world (Grovogui 1996).

The idea of war as an external practice of states, not tied to their internal workings and located according to specific normative projections of Western identity, followed from this colonial mentality. This mentality legitimized the exporting of violence to create a Western imperial pax and was so widespread that it shaped the development of modern warfare (Ellis 1986; Proudhon [1861] 1998). The colonial wars reproduced and reinforced ideologies of Western superiority, evidenced in part by the West’s superior military technology. A consequence of this racist hubris was the inability to foresee the destructive tendencies of Western warfare when unleashed against themselves (Ellis 1986).

The discipline of international relations, founded in response to the unexpectedly destructive character of the First World War, reproduced this understanding of war.14 This understanding disguises the possibility of increasing violence within the liberal world by presuming a historical narrative of progress and being shocked by its aberration. War, however, is not the absence of peace or an aberration of liberal progress, but is instead a phenomenological breaking of the liberal worldhood.15

Once a liberal order of democracy, free markets, and international institutions are spread throughout the world, liberal ideology imagines peace as the end state. Yet, states often deploy war under liberal guises.16 Wars under the aegis of humanitarian values and regime change are examples of the multifaceted character of liberal pacification. Liberal regimes emphasize the violence of those that they are invading, while minimizing the violence involved in these military undertakings and the violence necessary to sustain the liberal societies themselves. What Pierre-Joseph Proudhon called “the moral phenomenology of war” (Prichard 2015, 112–34; Proudhon [1861] 1998) becomes an integral part of the everyday workings of society that shape innumerable aspects of our daily language. The upshot is that, within liberal ideology, the violence committed by liberal states is justified, whereas the violence committed by illiberal states is not.

Postcolonial and anarchist scholarship focuses on the incorporation of violence in the production of liberal spaces (Barkawi and Laffey 1999). These same concerns can be directed onto the liberal order itself. Seen from the perspective of marginalized and oppressed populations, the structures of liberal pacification take on a distinctly violent aspect. The liberal world is not less violent. Rather, the liberal world involves a sophisticated phenomenological process of legitimating certain types of violence in order to render other types of violence invisible.

Liberal Pacification

What does it mean to apply this third type of violence to our understanding of international relations? Pacification reveals liberalism as a violent process as opposed to a system that is emblematic of the absence of direct violence. There are parallels between the Pax Britannia, Pax Americana, and the ancient peace of the Pax Romana (Neocleous 2010, 13). However, our account emphasizes the crucial role of pacification as a distinct kind of violence in maintaining these pacific orders. Our theory offers the novel insight that incorporating pacification into the analysis of the liberal peace reveals crucial aspects of this peace that conventional and critical accounts neglect.

A focus on pacification provides three critical insights. First, it recovers the crucial role of pacification in the historical founding of the liberal order. Second, by distinguishing between three kinds of violence (Figure 2), we account for the empirical observations of the liberal peace as leading to a decline in direct violence and an increase in violence overall as part of the pacification of the Pax Americana. Conversely, the liberal version of the Pax Americana cannot account for key anomalies. Third, our approach draws attention to the violent ordering of social relations. This dimension of violence is neglected even in Marxist, postcolonial, neo-Gramscian, and post-structuralist critiques of the liberal peace, which primarily focus on the role of direct and indirect violence in maintaining the Pax Americana.

Contemporary liberal international relations theory emphasizes the nonviolent role of the liberal triad (democracy, free markets, and institutions) in causing the liberal peace. Yet, a quick review of the history of liberalism in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries shows that key figures in liberalism, from John Stuart Mill, to Joseph Galliéni, to American foreign policy elites, understood pacification as a necessary step in establishing and maintaining the liberal order

Mill, one of the philosophical founders of liberalism, conceptualized and deployed liberalism as a domination strategy. Mill argued that it is appropriate to impose despotism or slavery on “savages” who incline to “fighting and rapine,” but the government should use force as little as possible:

What they require is not a government of force, but one of guidance. Being, however, in too low a state to yield to the guidance of any but those to whom they look up as the possessors of force, the sort of government fittest for them is one [that] possesses force, but seldom uses it. (Mill 1998, 232–33)

In terms of our conceptual distinction, Mill argued that liberalism as pacification was a more effective instrument of violence than the direct modes of violence that governments usually deploy.

The history of European colonialism is replete with this line of reasoning. “[L]iberal improvement” was a regular plank of colonial strategy by France and Britain in the nineteenth century (Owens 2015, 154). Consider one example from the French colonial tradition. Galliéni, a military commander and administrator, consciously deployed liberalism as a domination strategy in the pacification of Tonkin during the 1890s. Galliéni’s strategy involved slowly spreading military outposts and deploying civil administrators to create markets, schools, and amenities. The rationale was that locals would gain a personal interest in the continuation of French control and would help to quell Chinese brigandage. “Piracy,” said Galliéni, “is the result of an economic condition. It can be fought by prosperity” (quoted in Owens 2015, 157). Galliéni devised a “theory of pacification” in which “the correct combination of force and politics can socialize, pacify, and domesticate a population into regulating itself” (quoted in Owens 2015, 157). What Mill proposed in theory, Galliéni enacted in practice; pacification—the violent reordering of social relations in a colony—was a more effective means of maintaining liberal rule than the deployment of direct violence.

While less explicit, the relationship between liberalism and imperialism remained present in the twentieth-century development of the Pax Americana. During this era, US policy makers sought to construct a zone of peace distinct from the zones of war associated with authoritarian regimes. The US State Department first recognized the concept of “hegemonic pacification” in the Euro-Atlantic conference diplomacy of the 1920s (Cohrs 2008, 619). The United States’ “strategic restraint” in the aftermath of World War Two was motivated by this concept of liberal, hegemonic pacification (Ikenberry 2009; Ikenberry 2011, 173). US defense officials Stimson, Patterson, McCloy, and Assistant Secretary Howard C. Peterson agreed that it was a matter of the security interests of the United States to maintain “open markets, unhindered access to raw materials, and the rehabilitation of much—if not all—of Eurasia along liberal capitalist lines” (Leffler 1984, 349–56; Barkawi and Laffey 1999). Liberalism as a domination and pacifying strategy continued throughout (and long after) the Cold War (Laffey 2003; Stokes 2003), as evident in one of the founding documents of the post–World War Two liberal order, NSC-68 (Ikenberry 2011, 168). While the enforcement of a Pax Americana eventually yielded a decline in direct violence, it produced an increase in other types of violence. The first insight of our theory is that pacification has always been part of the liberal project and that the violence in the liberal project never went away.

The second insight is that by reinterpreting the liberal peace as liberal pacification we are able to grant the empirical findings of liberal peace theorists while maintaining that the Pax Americana represents an intensification of violence overall. In the language of positivist social science, our theory is observationally equivalent to that of liberal peace theory. We expect that the quantity of direct violence inversely associates with the degree of pacification in a society. Therefore, our interpretation challenges research that identifies liberal institutions as the cause of declining violence. Liberal institutions, as apparatuses of liberal pacification, ensure that direct violence is increasingly rare while leaving the structures of violence and domination in place. The observational equivalence on particular dependent variables (in our case, all forms of direct violence) produces a theoretical change requiring the generation of novel observable implications (King, Keohane, and Verba 1994, 30).

Furthermore, increased suffering in liberal societies provides evidence contradicting the main claims of liberal peace theories, while remaining consistent with liberal pacification. At its core, liberalism is a project that tries to maximize the utility of its subjects (in other words, minimize suffering while maximizing happiness). As such, a state of liberal peace should lead to a decrease in markers of suffering. However, there is more slavery in the world today than ever before, with conservative estimates of between 12.3 and 27 million people in debt bondage, chattel, or contract slavery (Gordon 2012).17 Moreover, there is ample evidence of rising psychological disorders in liberal societies. A preponderance of evidence from the United States suggests that depression, anxiety, alienation, opioid dependency, stress, other related psychological disorders, increased social isolation, and the decline of community have increased throughout the twentieth century (Twenge, Zhang, and Im 2004, 320; Adler, Boyce, Chesney, et al. 1994; Twenge 2000; Twenge, Konrath, Foster, et al. 2008; Twenge, Gentile, DeWall, et al. 2010; Cohen and Janicki-Deverts 2012; American Society of Addiction Medicine 2016). Changes to human life associated with modernity have caused psychological stress to increase (Jackson 2014). Mortality rates have increased for some white, non-Hispanics aged 45–54 in the United States between 1999 and 2013 (Case and Deaton 2015). Modern technological advances from television to the Internet may contribute to increasing separation and alienation of the social human animal into individualized bodies connected by increasingly weak and empty bonds (Putnam 2000; Gray 2011; Turkle 2011). At minimum, new information communication technology such as Facebook can increase the stress and anxiety of its users (Lee-Won, Herzog, and Park 2015). The violent structuring of liberalism enables increases in social alienation, anxiety, stress, and human bondage through repression, economic control, and social isolation.

These are not isolated instances of suffering. They are fundamental structural features of our liberal world. If liberalism is a process of pacification rather than simply peace, then this rise in individual suffering in liberal spaces may be evidence of a similar process that Fanon equated with the psychic life of the colonist. Just as Fanon’s colonial subjects, unable to lash out at the settler through direct violence, internalized their suffering, modern liberal subjects, unable to resist liberal pacification, internalize their suffering (1982, chap. 6; cf. Sorel 1999, 118). Liberal peace should bring about a rise in happiness; that it has instead led to rising suffering is evidence of liberal pacification.

Third, in addition to offering an alternative interpretation of the liberal peace, our theory of liberal pacification supplements key insights from critical approaches to peace. Tarak Barkawi and Mark Laffey’s work on imperial processes and liberal spaces makes a similar point to ours, that the celebrated zone of liberal peace rests on practices of violence (Barkawi and Laffey 1999, 2002; cf. Neocleous et al. 2013). Their account, however, focuses on practices of direct violence, such as humanitarian interventions against authoritarian regimes or corporations hiring local militias to make work sites in the global south safe for economic extraction (Barkawi and Laffey 1999, 422). Our point is that these moments of direct violence lead to pacification wherein social relations have been so violently reordered as to make direct violence no longer necessary. Once direct violence has established liberal space, pacification functions as a structure of violence that sustains the space. Direct violence only manifests itself when pacification weakens.

Pacification, however, does not merely operate through manipulating the conscience of its subjects. While Marxist and Gramscian concepts of ideology and hegemony are consistent with our theory of pacification (Peceny 1997, 418), they do not address how the constructed political order sustains itself through a violent reordering of social relations. A Gramscian-inspired critique of the democratic peace can yield a bird’s-eye view of the ways in which liberal peace theory is itself deployed as an ideological tool (Ish-Shalom 2006, 569–75). However, Gramscianinspired approaches do not account for the ways that everyday practices of violence (for example, surveillance technologies, implied threats from weapons, security barriers, etc.) sustain liberal pacification. While ideational factors are important in pacification, these factors rest upon practices and structures that are of an ontological-existential character. To review, our reinterpretation of the liberal peace as liberal pacification offers three novel insights. First, liberal scholars and others associate the development of the liberal order with peace and a decline in violence by ignoring how pacification is part of the liberal project. Second, the empirically observed decline in violence equated with the liberal peace is not necessarily a sign of human progress but could be a sign of intensified repression or increases in other forms of suffering across the liberal world order. Third, our concept of pacification reveals violence that is neither direct nor indirect but is phenomenologically structured into the world order. Understanding liberalism as pacification produces a paradigm shift. Liberal pacification is violent in the sense that it coerces a specific type of liberal docility, while also preventing types of resistance that might be understood as violent, including riots, insurrections, civil wars, and interstate wars. Pacification reveals the ongoing violence at the heart of a political project that imagines itself to be against violence.

Conclusion

Our account of pacification recovers a crucial aspect of pax, one originally etched into Roman monuments. The heading of the Res Gestae (the funeral monument to Emperor Augustus) reads, “[t]his is how he [Augustus] made the world subject to the power of the people of Rome” (Beard 2016, 364). This monument does not celebrate peace as the absence of violence; it celebrates pacification. Pax takes the form of a process that violently reorders the world so that imperial subjects are rendered incapable of using violence to resist Roman rule. The absence of overt acts of violence depends upon the maximization of pacification.

The practice of pacification includes threats, coercion, intimidation, and surveillance to restructure and sustain social and political relations. When this type of violence operates effectively, it appears as the absence of violence; pacification’s violence resides in the structuring of the prevailing order. While such an outcome may appear peaceful, it entails, at best, a negative peace that operates through a violent and coercive reordering of society.

Liberal peace advocates measure direct violence and equate the decline in that kind of violence with peace. However, our claim is that the spread of liberal institutions does not necessarily decrease violence but transforms it. Our phenomenological analysis captures empirical trends in human domination and suffering that liberal peace theories fail to account for, including increased inequality, slavery, anxiety, addiction, and anomie. Our analysis also highlights how a decline in direct violence may actually coincide with the transformation of violence in ways that are concealed, monopolized, and structured into the fabric of modern liberal society. If our theory is correct, we will find increases in markers of suffering as society liberalizes. While we cannot say whether these indicators are unique to pacified liberal societies, it is significant that they are rarely, if ever, discussed in terms of violence and the liberal peace.

Liberal pacification is observationally equivalent to liberal peace. This is not a semantic argument. Liberal peace advocates claim that processes that promote individual freedom and autonomy (that is, democracy, free markets, and global institutions) cause peace. While the restructuring of the global order—pacification—reduces direct violence, it also restructures social relations in ways that are violent. Declines in directly observable violence render other forms of violence invisible as violence; in fact, insidious, coercive, and violent systems of military deterrence and compellence, nuclear terror, surveillance, and intimidation constitute the worldhood of the liberal order.

## Block

### Kritik

#### 2 -- Repetition Compulsion -- the addendum of “extinction outweighs” to “black lives are affected too” is the Slave State’s advertisement that pornotropes black flesh a fungible tool for its existential project -- that ritual reputation is inseparable from the episteme of slavery and ensures complacency -- turns case.

**Warren ’18** [Calvin; 2018; Associate African American Studies at Emory University; *Ontological Terror; Blackness, Nihilism, and Emancipation*, “THE INVENTION OF THE NEGRO AND THE NECESSITY OF BLACK BEING,” p. 45-48]

In this schematic, the body is a metaphor for instrumentality or abject use value. Spillers suggests that this body “is reduced to a thing, to being for the captor.” With the death of African existence (the flesh) an oppres- sive mode of existence is imposed on the Negro. This existence is unlike human being. The human being’s mode of existence is to be for itself, and this being for itself is the structure of care between Dasein and Being. Black ~~being~~ is invented, however, precisely to secure the human’s mode of existence. Reading Spillers’s metaphysical schema through Heidegger’s, we could suggest that the black body or this “thing, being for the captor,” is invented to serve as the premier tool or equipment for human being’s existential project (and I would argue that this equipment is not equivalent in form to the human, even if the structure of tool-being, as Graham Harman would call it, provides a general explanatory frame).37 In other words, the mode of existence for black being is what Heidegger would call “availableness.” Availableness is “the way of being of those entities which are defined by their use in the whole.”38 To exist as “a thing, being for the captor” is to inhabit a mode of existence dominated by internecine use and function. Black being, then, is invented not just to serve the needs of economic interest and cupidity, but also to fulfill the ontological needs of the human. This thing is something like Heidegger’s equipment—an object that when used with such regularity becomes almost invisible, or trans- parent, to the user (blackness is often unthought because the world uses it with such regularity; antiblackness is the systemization of both the use of blackness and the forgetting/concealment of black being). Utility eclipses the thing itself. We must, then, understand antiblackness as a global, 46 Chapter One systemic dealing with black bodies, as available equipment. Heidegger considers dealings the way the Being of entities, or equipment, is revealed phenomenologically through the use of this equipment. Antiblack dealings with black bodies do not expose the essential unfolding, or essence, of the equipment; rather, the purpose of antiblack dealings is to systemically obliterate the flesh, and to impose nothing onto that obliterated space—care and value are obsolete in this encounter.39 Therefore, equipment structure is predicated on the premier use of blacks within the network of equipment. In other words, black use cuts across every equip- mental assignment, making it the ultimate equipment. Why does black equipment cut across all assignments, and why is it the tool Dasein relies on to commence its existential journey? We might say the answer to these difficult questions is that the essence of black equipment is nothing— being is not there. If Heidegger assumes that equipment will reveal its being through its usage, then he did not anticipate the invention of the Negro— equipment in human form, embodied nothingness. Using black equipment reveals existence but not being (existence as non-being for Greek philosophers, according to Heidegger in Introduction to Metaphysics). This puzzle is what black philosophy must investigate, must think through, to understand the continuity of antiblackness.

Spillers describes black being is a “living laboratory,” and we can conceptualize this laboratory as the source of availableness for modernity. A living laboratory is a collection of instruments for carrying out ontological experimentation, or the construction of the human self. Black beings constitute this irresistible source of availableness for the world. Saidiya Hartman meditates on the ontological utility of black being for the human when she states:

The relation between pleasure and the possession of slave property, in both the figurative and literal senses, can be explained in part by the fungibility of the slave—that is, the joy made possible by virtue of the replaceability and interchangeability endemic to the commodity—and by the extensive capacities of property—that is, the augmentation of the master subject through his embodiment in external objects and persons. Put differently, the fungability of the commodity makes the captive body an abstract and empty vessel vulnerable to the projection of others’ feelings, ideas, desires, and values; and, as property, the dispossessed body of the enslaved is the surrogate for the master’s body since it guarantees his disembodied universality and acts as the sign of his power and dominion.

40 Instruments, tools, and equipment are interchangeable/replaceable; this is starkly different from human being, whose existential journey in the world renders it incalculable and unique. When I suggest that black being is pure function or utility, I mean precisely the way this being is used as a site of projection for the human’s desires, fantasies, and onto- logical narcissism. The body that Spillers presents is a necessary invention because it is through the human’s engagement with instruments (tools and equipment) that the human comes to understand the self. To be for the human is to serve as the empty vessel for the human’s reflection on the world and self. In short, what I am suggesting is that black being is invented as an instrument to serve the needs of the human’s ontological project. This use, or function, exceeds involuntary labor and economic interest. It is this particular antiblack use that philosophical discourse has neglected. The Negro, as invention, is the dirty secret of ontometaphysics.

If we follow Heidegger’s understanding of the human being as Dasein (being there) and thrown into the world, then black being emerges as a different entity: the Negro is precisely the permanence of not being there [Nicht Da Sein], an absence from ontology, an existence that is not just gone away (as if it has the potential to return to being there) but an exis- tence that is barred from ever arriving as an ontological entity, since it is stripped of the flesh.41 To assert that black being is not of the world is to suggest, then, that black being lives not just outside of itself, but outside of any structure of meaning that makes such existence valuable. Black being is situated in a spatiotemporality for which we lack a grammar to capture fully. Spillers’s body, then, is the symbolic and material signifi- cation of absence from Being. To be black and nothing is not to serve as an aperture of Being for the Negro; rather, it is to constitute something inassimilable and radically other, straddling nothing and infinity. The Negro is the execration of Being for the human; it is with the Negro that the terror of ontology, its emptiness, is projected and materialized. This is the Negro’s function.

Inventing the Negro is essential to an ontometaphysical order that wants to eradicate and obliterate such ontological terror (the terror of 48 Chapter One the nothing); and since ontometaphysics is obsessed with schematization and control, it needs the Negro to bear this unbearable burden, the execration of Being. To return to our proper metaphysical question “How is it going with black being?,” we can say that neither progressive legislation nor political movements have been able to transform black being into human being, from fleshless bodies to recognized ontologies. Spillers also seems to preempt the question when she states, “Even though the captive flesh/body has been ‘liberated,’ and no one need pretend that even the quotation marks do not matter . . . it is as if neither time nor history, nor historiography and its topics, show movement, as [the flesh] is ‘murdered’ over and over again by the passions of a bloodless and anonymous archaism, showing itself in endless disguise.”42 This onticide, the death of the flesh/African existence, continues impervious to legal, historical, and political change. This is to say that the problem of black being, as both a form of ontological terror for the human and a site of vicious strategies of obliteration, remains. To ask the (un)asked question “How is it going with black being?” is to inquire about the resolution of the problem of black and nothing, ontometaphysically, as it imposes itself onto the Negro. The answer to the Negro Question, then, is that the ritualistic and repetitive murder of the flesh, the primordial relation, is absolutely necessary and indispensable in an antiblack world. And as long as the world exists, this murder must continue.

#### You’ve double turned yourself- Salt thinks that Disembodied performances of black sovereignty through white seduction recreate the same violence it seeks to solve.

**Salt 19**[Karen Salt, directs the Centre for Research in Race and Rights at the University of Nottingham, “Introduction: Sovereignty and Power,” *The Unfinished Revolution: Haiti, Black Sovereignty and Power in the Nineteenth-Century Atlantic World*, Pg 206-210, JMH]

In the introduction, I positioned this book within the critical conversations within black studies that circle around tragedy, futurity, pessimism, praxis, necropolitics, bare life and power. I have not settled my thoughts on these matters, now that I am at the end of this particular monographic journey, as much as I have firmed my conviction that we need debates and challenges about sovereignty in order to have futures for self-avowed black nation-states and those who feel the pulls and the circuits of global blackness within their national frames. **Black sovereignty is not a singular thing that every country must adopt or embrace. Instead, it is a journey of being and performing in the world that has the potential to demand and open space.** When it is weaponised or turned against the very people that it is meant to embolden, it constrains living and politics. What I now see as the main challenge to any and all black sovereignty projects is how to maintain their unfinished nature(s). I am not advocating “unfinishedness” due to any fear of becoming or because I do not think that people of African descent can engage or act politically. On the contrary, my call for the sustainment of being “unfinished” responds to an insistence that the only way that we can unknow and unlearn the nullifications within sovereignty is by challengingits very origins—by being present at its antithesis. **The trick will be in resisting the seduction offered by sovereignty’s power or other sovereign nations’ carrots of recognition and acceptance that often come with steep price tags**—such as the 1825 indemnity to France agreed by Boyer that not only failed to buffer Haiti against foreign intervention but also entangled it with crippling debts and loans that would take until the twentieth century to pay off. Given these tethers, how can black sovereignty grow and develop without being distorted? Hopefully, by thinking carefully about the tropes and configurations embedded within performances of sovereignty. Here are two vastly different contemporary examples of these tropes and figurations in action. Example 1. “Inside Disaster.” Before the 12 January 2010 earthquake, a documentary filmmaker talked with the Red Cross about filming their interactions and experiences during a future global disaster. The joint effort was agreed, and plans formed to create a set of public “knowledge encounters” focused on a particular disaster location. Although, at the time, the team did not know where the next disaster would strike, they continued to prepare for any eventuality that would enable them to capture the reality of humanitarianism. And then came the earthquake in Haiti. In the days and months that followed, the documentary team assembled information about the Red Cross, displaced persons, journalists, aid workers and others who moved into and out of the nation. They filmed, chatted with, listened to, embraced and visualised the disaster from as many perspectives as possible. This cast became part of a multi-platform documentary experience that includes what I will focus on here: a first-person role-playing simulation of the earthquake and its aftermath, “Inside the Haiti Earthquake.”33 I f﻿irst encountered the simulation when I taught a course for fourth-year students at the University of Aberdeen that borrowed its title from Laurent Dubois’s Haiti: The Aftershocks of History. This course examined disaster, policy, history, race, aid, foreign interventions, economic policies and sovereignty. It tested some of my theories about race and sovereignty while also drawing together all of the recent books, texts, exhibitions, documentaries, historical accounts and media coverage connected to the earthquake. This was a course focused on recent (and unfinished) history, but it was also one formed by a long and contentious set of patterns and tropes regarding foreign engagement within Haiti and sovereign battles for legitimacy, such as the continuing conflict between the USA and Haiti over Navassa Island. In the midst of this course, I had my students interact with the simulation. Its premise is simple: real footage allows an individual to take on the life of a survivor, a journalist and an aid worker. The camera pans out to convey actual scenes and situations at any given moment and continuously signals that the camera lens is the eye of the participant. This is first-person disaster re-enactment infused with actual footage of people and places on the ground. What tilts the simulation further is its interactive element: periodically, the action freezes and the “player” is faced with a set of multiple options for the next course of action that they must whittle down to one choice. These options involve choices—sometimes difficult ones—about food, housing, help, aid, work and other concerns. There are purportedly no right or wrong answers, just choices, and the action then resumes depending on what course of action the “player” decides, switching scenes, accordingly. Death and a casual orientation to destruction surround the “experience.” This casualness deeply disturbed my students. Yes, **the simulation made clear the realities of a natural disaster, but they also turned the real lives and circumstances of the people of Haiti—and those who arrived to help them—into consumable objects.** Gone, throughout the simulation, are any of the negotiations, the meetings, the planning, the organising amongst Haitian community groups and members, the impassioned speeches on the floor of the UN, the radio talks or the powerful pieces that tried to correct older logics and narratives about Haiti, such as the riveting conversation between Colin Dayan and Jonathan Katz that centred on Katz’s book, but covered broader territory, including politics and change.34 Described as “a simulation for donors, potential aid workers and volunteers,” the experience definitely feels as if its task is to bring people to an elsewhere where other people fix things**. The disembodiedness was to be expected as it is a firstperson experience, but my students felt uncomfortable with the reduction of Haiti, its history and its culture to only a problem area that needed fixing**. After reading about the experiences of people such as Danticat or Laferrière, my students felt that the simulation offered a voyeuristic tour of real people’s lives—not quite disaster pornography, but definitely an oversaturation of collapse and dis-ease. While the simulation may have wanted to capture the reality of life after the disaster, given Haiti’s history, the simulation struggles to raise the encounter above “the problem of Haiti.” The creators of this project and platform may strongly believe in the educational value of this tool—it has won many educational and gaming awards—but my students and I found its structure troubling. The problem is not exactly that disaster is turned into an interactional educational non-game. The real issue is that the choices in front of Haitians, at any time, dance amongst the tropes outlined in this book—tool, commodity, weapon, currency. By not adequately dealing with these topics, the “experience” feels unmoored—grounded in a humanitarian bubble—focused less on Haiti than on the experiences of those tasked to cover or help the nation. Efforts were made by the team to include the history of Haiti and information about its people, but the voyeuristic aspect of the disaster pushes into every frame. I sense the motives of the project and the platform are to counter this reading and assessment. My criticism is not a condemnation of the team’s efforts or their intent. What I am suggesting is that in experiencing the experience, my students—and I—struggled to see how it would address the aftershocks of history and enable Haiti to recover its own future, on its own terms.35

#### This is proven in the Slawotsky evidence that frames antitrust law around the imperative to dominate China. (we read Blue, Go Blue!)

**Slawotsky 21** – Joel, former law clerk to the Hon. Charles H. Tenney, (U.S.D.J., S.D.N.Y.) and AV peer-review rated attorney at Sonnenschein (now Dentons). In practice, he represented large corporations litigating in federal and state courts at both the trial and appellate level. Joel has authored book chapters and law journal articles published by: Boston, Duke, Emory, Georgetown, U.Penn, Virginia as well as the following peer-review non-U.S. law school based venues: Chinese Journal of Global Governance, Journal of World Trade, Oxford University Press, Transnational Dispute Management journal, and the Qatar University law review. “U.S. EXTRATERRITORIAL JURISDICTION IN AN AGE OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC STRATEGIC COMPETITION”, Georgetown Journal of International Law, <https://heinonline.org/HOL/LandingPage?handle=hein.journals/geojintl52&div=16&id=&page=>, xx-xx-2021

C. **Extraterritorial FCPA Enforcement Applied to Chinese State-Linked Entities**

As the following two subsections discuss, **there are two potential avenues for a U.S. court to determine whether the FCPA should be applied to overseas conduct**. **One** potential **option is finding** that **the specific conduct's effects in the United States were sufficient to constitute "adverse effects".** An alternative ground is that the U.S. financial system was used to effectuate the improper payments.

1. **Adverse Domestic Effects**--**Ideological, Technological, and Economic Rivalry**

**Emerging dual-use technology is a crucial national security to both the United States and China**. 181 China's stunning inroads in emergent technology is now starkly perceived by the United States as a national security threat: "[n]o country presents a broader, more severe threat to our ideas, our innovation, and our economic security than China." 182As discussed above, adverse effects in the context of the U.S-China hegemonic struggle are broad based and include U.S. claims that China seeks ideological, technological, and economic superiority over the United States. U.S. officials point to a one-party, state-capitalist model which jointly works towards these objectives.

**Concern over emergent technology is well-placed**. **Dominating emergent technologies will likely crown the hegemonic winner** for two reasons: **first, the offensive capabilities of emerging technology in the military is enormous.** **China's 5G efforts "present 'grave concerns' to the United States, our allies, and our partners** . . . . [**A] Chinese-developed 5G network 'provide[s] near-persistent data transfer back to China,' [] mean[ing] U.S. reliance on Chinese technologies for critical military communication."** 183 However, even in the non-military context [\*463] technological supremacy is potentially devastating: the power to shut or cause havoc in critical infrastructure, interference with a nation's capital markets and financial stability, election interference to run a desired candidate or influence public opinion and other permutations all offer effective and efficient paths to virtually conquer or seriously degrade a strategic adversary. 184 Second, nations able to exploit emergent technologies will bring vast sums of wealth to the sovereign. AI, for example, is expected to bring in many trillions in added global wealth and the leader in AI will reap the most benefit. 185 Emerging technological innovation such as 5G and AI are led by corporations exemplifying the significance of corporations in the hegemonic rivalry.

**Illustrative of the** potential "adverse **effects**" **test is the U.S. claim that Huawei poses a national security threat**. 186 **Huawei's efforts aimed at introducing Huawei's 5G infrastructure in U.S. allies' economies** 187 **is a key motivator of U.S. measures**, such as the China Initiative, on the basis that Huawei poses a national security interest to the United States. 188 Huawei has also violated U.S. sanctions and has been identified as a strategic adversary of the United States. 189 Indeed, **the United States** [\*464] **has threatened to withhold security cooperation should an ally allow Huawei into their nation. China understands the threat to its ascendancy and its national security and is threatening retaliation for heeding U.S. warnings**. 190 **U.S.** enforcement **agencies could argue that Huawei is an enterprise whose core self-interest as a state-linked entity is inapposite to U.S. interests and therefore bribery of foreign officials outside the United States (depending upon the particular facts) committed by Huawei undermines U.S. security.**

For purposes of the analysis of extraterritoriality and the FCPA, FBI Director Christopher A. Wray connected bribery and corruption to China's ambitions: "China is engaged in a highly sophisticated malign foreign influence campaign, and its methods include bribery, blackmail, and covert deals." 191 Indeed, and of particular import in the context of the U.S.-China hegemonic rivalry, the impetus for enacting the FCPA was to focus on the adverse domestic economic effects of overseas bribery on the U.S. economy in the context of the U.S.-Soviet rivalry. This is corroborated by Rachel Brewster: "the 'major motivation for the FCPA was a perception of the national security risks that foreign payments posed. Congressional hearings highlighted the legislators' very strong concern that foreign corrupt payments were harming the United States' ability to win the Cold War." 192

This motivation is significant: the FCPA was motivated by national security concerns arising from the U.S.-Soviet rivalry. As stated by Brewster, "[t]ogether, the national security concerns [] posed by illicit corporate payments abroad were sufficient to achieve legislative passage of the FCPA." 193

The parallels between the U.S.-Soviet and U.S.-China rivalries are striking. The motivation driving the FCPA was related to national security in the context of the U.S.-Soviet competition and was a manifestation of concern that overseas bribery would subvert the United States' ability to prevail in its strategic rivalry against the Soviet Union. It is critical in examining congressional intent to appreciate the linking of [\*465] corruption with defending U.S. national interests. U.S. enforcement agencies could argue that Chinese corporate bribery of foreign officials impedes the United States' ability to prevail against China.

U.S. government enforcement agencies can point to the clear congressional intent in enacting the FCPA and its amendments 194--the defense of the national interests of the United States to prevail in the U.S-Soviet struggle. 195If foreign corporations violate the FCPA and corruptly take business from U.S. corporations, enforcement agencies can argue that the conduct adversely impacts U.S. interests within the U.S.-China contest. Alternatively, enforcement agencies may claim that Chinese violations of the FCPA, which erode U.S. technological dominance or otherwise promote Chinese state goals, directly cause adverse domestic effects. Therefore, Chinese corporate conduct violating the FCPA might be viewed by U.S. government agencies as engaging in subverting U.S. national interests. This argument is likely to be advanced in the context of the China Initiative and heightened FCPA enforcement.

2. Utilizing U.S. Financial Institutions or U.S. Dollars, or Both

As discussed above, U.S. enforcement agencies have successfully resolved FCPA enforcement actions on the basis that jurisdiction is established by defendants' utilization of the U.S. Dollar financial system. The DOJ and SEC have relied on sending a wire transfer to or from a U.S. bank, or U.S. correspondent bank, to satisfy jurisdictional requirements based on a broad understanding of the statute. The language of the FCPA supports the DOJ and SEC position:

[A]ny person other than an issuer . . . or a domestic concern . . . while in the territory of the United States, corruptly to make use of the mails or any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or to do any other act in furtherance of [a corrupt payment.] 196

In the decades following the FCPA Amendments, financial and technological innovation has transformed business conduct. Since the late 1990s, using the "mails" has been essentially replaced with e-mail and [\*466] other communications services such as WhatsApp, Signal or other systems. "Any means" can include sending virtual currency from a United States-based Bitcoin exchange or wallet to one in another nation (or vice-versa). No longer does one have to take a flight and physically present oneself in U.S. territory and request a financial services institution to wire money from one account to another with a U.S. bank intermediary. Someone engaging in a corrupt payment under the FCPA can simply enter the U.S.-based institution or exchange's website or send an email or a WhatsApp message to a variety of virtual financial service providers from the comfort of a yacht, hotel room, or personal residence in almost any location. Physical presence within a territory is not required. Based upon a transformative and innovative financial services landscape, the utilization of the U.S. financial system, whether that is a United States-based financial institution or United States-based virtual currency exchange or wallet, should be the controlling factor as opposed to demanding physical presence within U.S. territory.

Recently, in the context of a different federal statute, the Second Circuit's United States v. Napout 197ruling confirms that overseas violations of U.S. statues are justiciable on the basis that jurisdiction is established by utilizing the U.S. Dollar financial system from overseas. The Second Circuit observed that a presumption against extraterritorial applications of statutes exists unless the unambiguous statutory text states otherwise. And in Napout, the Second Circuit allowed for extraterritorial application of a federal statute and rejected defendants' appeal, concluding that the case involved a domestic application of the statute. The court noted that the defendants used United States-based bank accounts and wires to receive the majority of the $ 3.3 million in bribes, and the "use of wires in the United States therefore was integral to the transmission of the bribes in issue." 198Therefore, the court held that the application of Section 1346 to defendants' conduct was permissible.

Pursuant to this perspective, jurisdiction over FCPA violations exists even without physical presence in the United States. 199The ability to bring Chinese entities within the enforcement rubric of the FCPA via the defendant's utilization of U.S. financial institutions allows [\*467] government agencies to reach a large majority of international transactions which are generally U.S. Dollar denominated.

Although a discussion of the historical relationship of extraterritoriality as an outgrowth of state sovereignty is beyond the scope of this Article, it is sensible to conclude that in a virtual world the concept of "territory" should reflect the huge leaps technology has made that render "physical presence in a territory" a more nebulous concept. The fact that financial services innovation enables the opening of accounts and the seamless transfer of funds instantaneously would favor an updated conception of territorial jurisdiction to encompass the use of financial accounts in the country seeking to exercise extraterritorial jurisdiction. In other contexts, this reality is already self-evident. For example, the U.S. efforts at combatting terrorism and money laundering expanded the basis for jurisdiction to include using financial accounts located in the United States. 200Even with respect to civil lawsuits, banking through the United States may constitute a sufficient nexus to rebut the presumption against extraterritoriality. 201As we enter a virtual currency paradigm, Bitcoin and other types of currencies, let alone CBDCs may become alternatives or supplements to traditional banking and will likely be considered as "financial institutions" for purposes of evaluating whether a corrupt payment was conducted by accessing a U.S. financial institution.

Therefore, based upon modern technologies, the conceptualization of a "territorial nexus" via the use of wiring funds through U.S. banks or financial institutions is sensible. Banking relationships with U.S. correspondent accounts in the United States, because of the significance of such accounts to further the bribery, should allow enforcement agencies to pursue bad actors. 202Utilizing United States-based Bitcoin exchanges to further an FCPA violation could also fall within a modern conceptualization of "sending money to or from" a bank account. Accordingly, while not yet challenged and therefore not yet ruled [\*468] upon, it is likely that the DOJ and SEC's position on use of U.S. financial accounts to find jurisdiction would be accepted by U.S. courts.

V. CONCLUSION

In the age of the U.S.-China hegemonic rivalry, the increasing perception that Chinese international economic activities serve to undermine U.S. economic and security interests will likely lead to enhanced FCPA enforcement against Chinese corporations. China's unique one-party political system and the state's significant role in managing and directing business affairs magnifies the United States' concern over business activities by Chinese entities. Enforcement agencies will in all likelihood increase their scrutiny of Chinese business activity worldwide and endeavor to enforce the FCPA against Chinese entities--particularly but not exclusively--against state-linked entities. **U.S. courts will need to grapple with the question whether the Chinese business activity and alleged violation of the FCPA outside the United States created either adverse negative effects within the United States, or alternatively, utilized U.S. financial institutions to further the violation.** Enforcement agencies will point to the United States' view of national security as a fusion of ideological, technological, and economic threats which will serve to impede the United States' ability to prevail in the strategic contest. In addition, **the use of U.S. financial institutions which has been successfully used by the DOJ and SEC in prior FCPA enforcement actions will likely be relied upon as well.** In the present environment, U.S. courts are likely to side with U.S. government agencies since China and the United States are locked in an ever-widening hegemonic struggle. **U.S. courts would likely consider Chinese government-linked corporate conduct as potentially impinging on U.S. national interests. Particularly in emergent technology, this view is sensible as dominance in emerging industries will crown the hegemonic winner. Therefore, depending upon the specific Chinese entity and the conduct involved, U.S. enforcement agencies may have grounds to argue that the Chinese state-linked corporate violation falls within extraterritorial jurisdiction of U.S. courts.**

#### Libidinal economy is true

Chico et al 11 (A Primer on "Libidinal Economy" in Relation to Black Folks. Cosmic Hoboes: An Afropessimist Meditation (No)Space. <https://cosmichoboes.blogspot.com/2011/08/primer-on-libidinal-economy-in-relation.html>)

People who are interested in struggle need to understand the "libidinal economy." Coalition politicos like Al Sharpton like to tell us to put the unique experiences of black folks in the backseat to the interests of poor folks more generally. Such politicians expect us to submerge our interests as black people on the assumption that if poor people in general benefit from a political concession, poor black people will share equally in such benefits. Such politicos will continue to ignore the repeated evidence that a lot of nonblack people hate black people, even if doing so costs them money. If someone tells you that the problems black folks face are really just the problems that poor people face, they are telling you to ignore the libidinal economy. They are telling you that the political economy of capitalism is more important than the libidinal economy of antiblack racism. What is "libidinal economy"? In Red, White, and Black: Cinema and the Structure of U.S. Antagonisms (2010, Duke University Press), black political theorist Frank Wilderson highlights the distinction between political economy and libidinal economy (p. 9): Jared Sexton describes libidinal economy as “the economy, or distribution and arrangement, of desire and identification (their condensation and displacement), and the complex relationship between sexuality and the unconscious.” Needless to say, libidinal economy functions variously across scales and is as “objective” as political economy. Importantly, it is linked not only to forms of attraction, affection and alliance, but also to aggression, destruction, and the violence of lethal consumption. He emphasizes that it is “the whole structure of psychic and emotional life,” something more than, but inclusive of or traversed by, what Gramsci and other marxists call a “structure of feeling”; it is “a dispensation of energies, concerns, points of attention, anxieties, pleasures, appetites, revulsions, and phobias capable of both great mobility and tenacious fixation.” What does all this mean? Let's interpret this elaborate definition and get to how it thinks of "economy." When we think of economy, we usually think of something having to do with money. Wilderson uses the term political economy to refer to economy in the ways that we usually think of it: the ways people exchange materials and decide on how things are valued. Economy doesn't just mean the economy in the sense of the stock market or banks, but also any means of determining whether something is worth doing or possessing based on how much capital and labor power it yields. In struggle, we see over and over that money talks and bullshit walks. Economy has to do with what they value moves people to act. Economies are therefore very important to political action. But can there be an economy that exchanges something other than money or capital? Yes. To understand "economy" as Wilderson and Sexton use it, we have to think of economy in a more general way as things of all kinds that we can trade or save. You can accumulate not only cash or material items, but also fears and desires. Certain people accumulate more fear (the black athlete) and desire (the blonde cheerleader) than others. The term libidinal economy refers to the systems of exchange and valuation for fantasies, desires, fears, aversions, and enjoyment. Economy is about exchange and accumulation. Everyone feels fear and aggression, but where is it directed? The libidinal is about both people's desires, fantasies, and pleasures AND their phobias, fears, and violent consumptions. A libidinal economy has to do with which groups a subject is attracted to, which groups it is willing to form alliances with, and which people it is willing to provide affection to. Where can we see this libidinal economy? How can we illustrate this distinction? The libido is the collection of things like phobias and desires that are unconscious and invisible but that have a visible effect on the world, including the money economy. Some examples: We see libidinal economies at work any time there is a response by state that is out of all proportion to the material effects of any practice they are regulating. The USA incarcerates three million people, despite the fact that doing so has an adverse impact on US financial security. Hence the libidinal economy of the fear of black and brown people (who together comprise the overwhelming majority of inmates) trumps the political economy of the cost-benefit analysis of maintaining prisons. Let's take another example of the powder - versus crack-cocaine distinction, in which the same drug is punished differently at the federal level. Because the two drugs are chemically identical, there shouldn't be any distinction between how their use and sale is punished. In 2010, the law made it so that these two drugs were punished the same, although the Obama administration isn't in any hurry to make the abolition of this distinction retroactive so that the mostly black and brown people who are locked up because of it will get released. But the legal abolition of this distinction is not essential for us to look at. What is essential is why that distinction was made in the first place. Wilderson's work suggests that, for civil society, black people pose a threat that has nothing to do with the chemical content or the social and cultural effects of crack. Simply by being associated with black people, crack is seen as 100 times more threatening than is powder cocaine. The financial and social costs of locking all those black and brown people up and the financial and social costs of allowing all those white people to go free and continue to sell does not really matter to civil society. What the powder- versus crack-cocaine distinction shows is the desire to contain the threat that blackness symbolizes. This is the mark of libidinal economy. Cops, soldiers, firemen are considered sexually desirable because they become the heroes of civil society. The Oscar Grant shooting. Amadou Diallo was a victim of a extreme kind of violence because of the phobias that converged on his body. What is the exchange? Civil society has an anxiety about crime, and crime is always attached to black in urban areas. Police don't have to get a monetary award, but they get the gratitude of civil society. How does this play out in ways that don't have to do strictly with money? The desire for them may not show up in the amount of money they make. Cops get rewarded for their aggression. When the cop slammed dude into the glass at BART. Prison guards, thought of as having the toughest beat on the planet. They get rewarded for being the last line of defense against George Jackson. Oscar Grant was an accumulation of aggression and phobias. Why are the black people in Prince George's County, Maryland, segregated from white people in their same socioeconomic bracket with the same kinds of high-value real estate, and the same kinds of political-economic values? Living around white people has a value that cannot be explained in strictly monetary terms. AFDC benefited mostly white single mothers, and enjoyed a long history of support from 1936-the 1960s. It initially excluded black people. By the 1960s, when black people started getting it, attitudes changed toward it, making it seem like it was undeserved and a drain on national prosperity, and by 1984, when Ronald Reagan referred to "welfare queens in Cadillacs," it was clear that AFDC was "a black thing." In actual statistical terms, it was still used mostly by white women. But once it became associated with poor black women, it was seen as in need of drastic, radical reforms. But is this "libidinal economy" really that important? Frank Wilderson is using the distinction between a money economy and an economy of desire over and over again throughout this book. Wilderson talks about this by talking about the difference between word and deed. This is not the hypocrisy of the system. It IS the logic of the system. So Europeans tried to resolve the lack of labor power by passing laws that reduced homeless white people to the status of slaves. In the end, however, they never really enforced these laws. Wilderson quotes David Eltis, an economic historian, who says that the costs of settling the "new world" would have been significantly reduced if Europeans has simply enslaved other Europeans. But, Wilderson points out, "what Whites would have gained in economic value, they would have lost in symbolic value; and it is the [symbolic value] which structures the libidinal economy of civil society." In other words, the symbolic costs of Europeans enslaving other Europeans would have been too great. Instead, they went to Africa for their slaves, even though the financial cost of doing so was much, much greater. The radical left doesn't make this distinction. Cornel West and Tavis Smiley say they want to organize a new Poor People's Campaign, but they won't be able to explain why this is a failed project from the start. This is because they won't think about the aspects of coalition building that have nothing to do with money or the lack of money. In the late 1970s and early 1980s, the so-called "Reagan Democrats" were poor and working-class white people, many of them in unions, who voted overwhelmingly for Reagan against their own economic interest. The white left mistakenly thinks about the Reagan Democrats as people who were duped. They view them as an example of what Marx called "false consciousness" and they see it as their duty to inform the white poor and working class of why they should vote left. But there were all kinds of signs that white poor and working-class folks simply hated black people and didn't want to live anywhere that there was a large community of black people, even if those black people are of the same or higher socioeconomic status. The Reagan Democrats were excited by Reagan's antiblack rhetoric of law and order, a rhetoric that was in response against the activities of the Black Liberation Army, Weather Underground, Black Panthers, and Black Guerilla Family. Marxists think a person is in a state of false consciousness if her political or social interests go another way than her material or financial interests. If you adopt this view, then you probably think that the Reagan Democrats just need to be educated correctly about what they have in common with the black poor and working class. You have to think that their hatred of black people is somehow "false" simply because it runs counter to their financial interests. But this would be to ignore their interest in maintaining white supremacy and antiblack racism. One of the things white men would lose would be access to black bodies for sexual pleasure and amusement. These examples are not just isolated cases of false consciousness, ignorance, media manipulation, or some mystical thing called "prejudice." They are all of those things, but they are also something much, much greater that any student of struggle needs to be aware of. These examples reveal the contours of an economy of desires that is not primarily concerned with money. It's not that the political economy isn't also antiblack. In fact, both economies are antiblack.

#### We straight turn McCarthy.

Kelley, 15—Gary B. Nash Professor of American History at UCLA (Robin D.G., “Beyond Black Lives Matter,” Kalfou, Vol. 2, Iss. 2, (Fall 2015): 330-337, dml)

This implicit appeal to acknowledge us-to recognize our humanity, our dignity, and our right to live-is understandable in a world where the statesanctioned killing and caging of Black bodies is routine. But as George Lipsitz observed, such appeals are embedded in a humanist logic that emphasizes "interiority" and feeling, thereby elevating "the cultivation of sympathy over the creation of social justice."7 That is to say, our feelings of empathy in any representation of suffering are designed to be understood and individually felt rather than transformed into collective praxis. This is partly why concepts like reparations are so antithetical to modern liberalism. Given the trauma produced by an endless video loop of Black people dying at the hands of police officers who are almost never indicted, let alone prosecuted and convicted, collective healing and the cultivation of sympathy are to be expected. On one hand, this makes the movement's counterslogan, "All Lives Matter," all the more offensive and painful. "All Lives Matter" is heard and felt as a belittling or decentering of anti-Black racism. It trades on postracial myths of equivalency in suffering. On the other hand, sometimes we react to "All Lives Matter" with such hostility that it stands in as an unambiguous expression of anti-Black racism. Can we salvage these words? Don't we want to build a world in which every life is valuable, cherished, and sustained? Are we not seeking a world that recognizes multiple sites of dispossession and recognizes that state violence inside US borders is inseparable from US militarism around the world? The fact that we are compelled to a defensive position is a consequence of focusing on proving our value rather than critiquing the system that devalues all of us and destroys the world in the process.

The veracity of our humanity was never the issue-then or now. The problem lies with Western civilization's very construction of the human. As Sylvia Wynter, Cedric Robinson, Aimé Césaire and others have been saying for decades, the "Negro" was an invention, a fiction-like that of the Indian, the Oriental, the "Mexican," etc. Or in Frantz Fanon's oft-quoted line from The Wretched of the Earth: "It is the colonist who fabricated and continues to fabricate the colonized subject."8 Indeed, the entire structure of global white supremacy depends on such inventions, like the fictions of the Arab as non- or anti-Western and the "Immigrant" as essentially Latino/a, or the notion that indigenous people (in North America at least) are all dead. This is why we have such a hard time acknowledging that most so-called immigrants from Mexico and Central America are, in fact, indigenous.

The very foundations of Western civilization were built on such fabrications and enacted through violence. Once they crumble, so goes Western civilization's conceit as well as the massive philosophical smokescreen that enables (racial) capitalism-the greatest, most destructive, most violent crime wave in history-to masquerade as the engine of progress, a pure expression of freedom and liberty, the only path to human emancipation. The modern world that invented the Negro, the Oriental, the Indian, and the Savage as a means of inventing European Man was built on the theft of humans, theft of land and water, indiscriminate murder, violation of customary rights, moral economy, enclosure of the commons, destruction of the planet-outright lawlessness, justified by supposed rationality or what Weber might call instrumental rationality. To leave it at Black Lives Matter unintentionally conceals the crime. After all, these were the very processes that birthed the liberal humanism to which BLM activists seem to appeal.

In his book Forgeries of Memory and Meaning, Cedric Robinson further elaborates on the systems of racial maintenance and myth making, the "racial regimes" responsible for the inventions of the Negro (the Indian, the Oriental) and their relation to capital. What exactly are racial regimes? In Robinson's words, they "are constructed social systems in which race is proposed as a justification for the relations of power." The power is real and formidable but surprisingly unstable. For Robinson, "the covering conceit of a racial regime is a makeshift patchwork masquerading as memory and the immutable. Nevertheless, racial regimes do possess history, that is, discernible origins and mechanisms of assembly. But racial regimes are unrelentingly hostile to their exhibition."9 In other words, to say that anti-Blackness is foundational to Western civilization is not to say that it is fixed or permanent. On the contrary, it is incredibly fragile and must be constantly remade; it is epiphenomenal to the production of Blackness-which is an essential component of modern racial regimes, but not its totality. In the last century alone, racial regimes have been remade, reconfigured, destabilized, and consolidated many times, employing new technologies to circulate old racial fabulations and new fictions in the process of capitalist expansion.

Proving one's humanity will not uproot racial regimes, for the very evidence of our humanity is their raison d'etre. Our exploitation is evidence of our value, but it requires enormous intellectual, juridical, and psychic resources to conceal our humanity. Slavery was not just social death, but was based on a cost-benefit analysis that assumed the disposability of Black lives. The system of extracting surplus emerged within a logic of racial hierarchy and racial subjugation that dragged Africans, Asians, and Europeans proletarianized by enclosure to the lands of the Americas, Oceania, parts of South Asia and Africa, and the Eastern Mediterranean-where indigenous people were dispossessed, enslaved, or exploited by other means. Enclosure is yet another example of theft and violence masking as "law, order, security": backed by the rule of law, the state employs violence to discipline, to reclassify, to criminalize, and to destroy sovereignty and create disorder. Enclosure is part of this process of war-a war on the commons, which ultimately turns some of the expropriated people into a proletariat (including European industrial, maritime, and landless rural labor, as well as prostitutes and beggars), turns a portion into settlers, and sends a portion to the workhouse. Some are merely casualties whose flesh mingles with the earth and whose bodies-sometimes hanging from a tree or broken on the wheel-serve to terrorize those who resist the new discipline.10

While the value of Black labor may have ebbed and flowed with the changing character of the global economy, there has never been a moment in US history when our humanity mattered, when Black people could enjoy full privileges and protections of citizenship. But the same can be said of most of the planet-at least until the mid-twentieth century, although I would venture to say this is still the case. What Black resistance calls into question is the inhumanity of the system, the inhumanity of those who subjugate in the name of civilization; it insists that the survival of humanity (and this is not the humanity defined by the Enlightenment) depends on the complete destruction of racial capitalism, patriarchy, and regimes of normativity.

As I wrote in the aftermath of the George Zimmerman verdict, unless we come to terms with this history, we will continue to believe that the system just needs to be tweaked, or the right-wing fringe defeated, or our humanity acknowledged.11 We will miss the routine character of state violence; its origins in the very formation of colonialism, slavery, and capitalism; and the ways in which routine violence has become a central component of US policies, including drone warfare and targeted killing. We cannot change the situation simply by finding the right legal strategy, the best policies, or recognition.

### Case

**Subpoints 2 and 3---Embracing extinction as a narrative—not biological—phenomenon is a prerequisite to disrupting white desires**

**Schotten, 18**—Associate Professor of Political Science and an affiliated faculty in Women's and Gender Studies, University of Massachusetts-Boston (C. Heike, “SOCIETY MUST BE DESTROYED,” *Queer Terror: Life, Death, and Desire in the Settler Colony* pg 108-111, dml)

How, then, to articulate and effect the radical abolitionism of revolutionary desire without getting caught up in the stranglehold of futurism? Futurism’s inescapability means **not simply that politics is irredeemable** and **reform insufficient**, but also that the deconstructive or queer practice of **subversive redeployment** is a **naïve delusion** regarding our own ability to **think** and **act outside** or **beyond futurist mandates**. As Edelman simultaneously argues and demonstrates, futurism’s **stifling determination** of the very domain of the political itself means that **any** and **all resistance is always already coopted**, while revolt is an impossibly queered space that is simultaneously named and foreclosed by the death drive. Yet Edelman’s solution to this dilemma is to recommend neither **capitulation** to futurism nor some sort of **compromise** with it but rather an **accession to its worst nightmares** in an embrace of queerness that will **destroy it from within**, “shortcircuit[ing] the social in its present form.”74 In other words, rather than **defend** society, which Edelman finds indefensible, much less **deconstruct** society, as a queer critique of norms might recommend, or even (dear me!) **redeem** society, by **entreating a utopian vision** that imagines the overcoming of all suffering and oppression, Edelman instead declares we must **destroy society**. And we do so by **taking up**, **inhabiting**, or “**embracing**” the very “**death**” that futurism **inevitably produces** as the queer by- product of its social ordering. He thus **dismisses utopianism** in the name of an **immediacy** that “**the future stop here**,”75 challenging us to live life as an **insistent presentism** that will **do nothing else afterward but die**, and casting this alliance with death as the **act of revolutionary resistance**.

While Dean vociferously rejects this “embrace” because of its psychoanalytic impossibility, Edelman, I think, is well aware of this fact and recommends it precisely for this reason, a contradiction that becomes more intelligible if understood politically rather than solely psychoanalytically. Indeed, Edelman’s recommendation of this “embrace” is a clearly political position— despite what he may say otherwise— in two specific, complex ways. First, recall the historicization of Edelman’s argument provided in chapter 2, wherein I characterized his version of “politics” as a distinctly modern, European, settler colonial sovereignty. An important consequence of this historicization is that, even in his allegedly non- or antipolitical advocacy, Edelman **cannot actually be rejecting politics per se** since, despite his own claims to the contrary, there is **no such thing**. Abolishing modern politics or futurist politics is **not equivalent to abolishing politics as such** and could only mean as much if **every modernity were European modernity**, if **every politics were a sovereign biopolitics**, and if **every temporality were futurist**. To understand Edelman’s refusal of politics as a **refusal of any and all politics existing anywhere** is to **go along with** his unmarked **universalist presentation of** reproductive **futurism** as the **logic of everything existing everywhere all the time**, itself a frequent conceit of psychoanalytic frames.76 But if futurism is the **temporality of modern biopolitical sovereignty**, it **immediately becomes clear that other temporalities are possible**, even as other versions of politics **must necessarily exist**.77 As Audra Simpson argues, for example, “Indigenous political orders are quite simply, first, . . . **prior** to the project of founding, of settling, and as such **continue to point**, in their persistence and vigor, to the **failure of the settler project to eliminate them**, and yet are subjects of dispossession, of removal, but their polities serve as **alternative forms of legitimacy** and **sovereignties** to that of the settler state.”78

Historicizing futurist politics in this way means that alternative temporalities or political schemas **exist** but are queer(ed) and **represented as existential threats** to it: as **unintelligible**, **unlivable**, **immoral**, **backward**, and “**savage**.” While Edelman does indeed conflate all politics with futurism, such that his call for the destruction of politics seems to portend an unthinkable and intolerable nihilism, it is nevertheless the case that, once situated historically, the advocacy that queers **accede to the deathly positioning** to which they are always already relegated by reproductive futurism is **not some sort of unthinkable**, **antipolitical vision**, nor is it an **advocacy of suicide** or **some sort of necropolitical imperative**. Rather, in the context of a **European modernity** built on the colonization of most of the rest of the world, Edelman’s embrace of death can be read as a **prescription** for an **anticolonial allegiance to** and **alliance with those forms of politics** and **temporality that thwart**, **refuse**, or **deny futurism’s colonial mandates**. No Future’s embrace of the “death drive,” in other words, is a **championing of resistant futures** and **political systems** that **show up as death from a futurist perspective** and are various surrogates for the broad, structural category he designates as “queer.” In advocating for a revolution on behalf of queers and arguing for an embrace of queerness, then, Edelman is very much arguing in the name of something— not the future, of course, and certainly not life in any biological sense. But he is also **not quite arguing in the name of death in a biological sense**, either. Rather, he is arguing that “the dead” should “live,” that is, that they “come to life” (or insistently exist) and **animate the destruction of the settler order** that they are always already **consigned by that social order to symbolize**. This is, in other words, an argument for indigenous existence as resistance to settler sovereignty. Siting and situating futurism historically make clear that Edelman’s recommended accession to queerness/death is another name for radical resistance to sovereign biopolitics and that, **far from nihilism**, it is an **emancipatory** and **decolonizing political recommendation** of the first order. In this sense, even Edelman’s own project is wedded to life, albeit a life that is unlivable as life, which is the status of native life within settler colonial regimes. As he says in recommendation of embracing the death drive, “political self- destruction inheres in the only act that counts as one: the act of resisting enslavement to the future in the name of having a life.”79 Edelman’s opposition to the political can therefore be reread as a **wholesale opposition** to the sovereign biopolitics of European modernity and an **imagining of the death of that political order** as the **content of revolutionary politics**. Indeed, his suggestion of a necessary “counterproject”80 to futurism makes clear that his recommendation of this refusal is the **essential**, **necessary**, and **definitive act of political resistance**, even as it is a **championing of the lives** and **political temporalities** of those **determined to be emissaries of death**.

Importantly, this destructive refusal is a threat that redounds back on Edelman himself and on **all of us who share** his **habitation of futurist politics** in Western modernity (or who were ourselves **trained in the history of that thought**). This is the second, complex way that Edelman’s rejection of politics is in fact a **maximally political entreaty**. The tension at work in Edelman’s inevitably futurist call to end futurism means that he is also and necessarily calling for the destruction of his own revolutionary project and subjective/authorial position. This is a queer revolution that **queers the aims of revolution itself**, divesting itself of futurism even as it speaks in its name. As a political act, it amounts “to **put[ting] one’s foot down at last**, **even if doing so costs us the ground on which we**, **like all others**, **must stand**.”81 It is a revolutionary desire that seeks to dispossess revolution of its failed foundations without thereby relinquishing either revolution or its animating desire. This revolutionary discourse exceeds the parameters of revolution as it has hitherto unfolded in modernity, even as it promises a liberation from modernity’s— and liberation’s— moralizing constraints.

This paradoxical, queer(ed) revolution is therefore **unmistakably tied to death**, and in more than one way: not only because queerness is the structural position of anything antisociety and antilife; not only because it **demands the destruction of all that has been construed as life** (as **valuable life**, as **worthy life**, as life **worth living** and **endowed with a future**); but also because the revolutionary call to destroy society and its futurist temporality will **necessarily result in the eradication of its own revolutionary demand in the process**. This is why Edelman’s queer political project **can never recommit us to sovereignty**, whether of a charismatic revolutionary leader, a vanguard revolutionary class, or a theological vision of an allpowerful monarch, much less the **sovereign subject**, whose **very European coherence requires futurism’s linear temporality**. It can commit us **only to the destruction of these things**, as well as to the **eradication of our own commitments precisely to that very destruction** if, as, and when they **threaten to become the next crushing futurist ideal**. Edelman’s formulation of the **impossible** yet **wholly revolutionary goal** of refusing futurism— a refusal achievable only in a future that lies beyond its textual articulation and summary rejection there— offers a **rich** and **provocative articulation** of a revolutionary desire that seeks to **dispossess revolution of its very foundations**, even as it speaks in its name.

#### Subpoints 4 and 5---Extinction framing occludes material differences between the valuation of different subject positions, which leaves civil society as a determinant of value unthought.

Smith, 16—Assistant Professor Department of Religion, La Salle University (Anthony, “Fabulation, or Non-Philosophy as Philo-Fiction,” *Laruelle: A Stranger Thought*, Chapter 6, pg 125-129, dml)

When one engages in critical theory around the question of race, it is not uncommon for well-meaning individuals to ask whether it is truly anti-racist to recognize and name another person as raced in any way whatsoever. Race is, after all, a fiction, or what Laruelle would call a hallucination of the (lived) human. So is it right to engage with that fiction, when it has driven some of the most sadistic violence imaginable against other human beings? Would it not be better, such a well-meaning individual will ask, to drop this fictional account and treat all human beings simply as human beings? Does not such treatment arise out of a refusal to recognize racial difference or distinction? It may even seem as if such a ques-tion is grounded upon strong non-philosophical commitments to the generic nature of the (lived) human. The reality, as can be derived already from the preceding two chapters, is very different. Laruelle's theory is interesting precisely because of its strangeness to standard liberal conceptions of politics, ethics, and aesthetics. Such liberal accounts, even when they are radical liberal accounts, are largely dependent upon a philosophy of recognition and representation played out between two terms that occludes a third term which determines that relationship. This is another way of saying, of course, that such a philosophy manifests the structure of Philosophical Decision, but it surfaces in a different way why there might be something of Philosophical Decision to resist and struggle against. The occluded third term of Philosophical Decision may come to oppress or control in nefarious ways the other two terms, and it is naturalized or normalized in such a way as to be beyond criticism.

How does this abstract structure relate to the question of insist-ing on a certain set of names as privileged fictional names for the Human-in-Human that lies beyond naming? With regard to the way the fiction of race manifests in the world, the two terms could be many things, but if Wilderson and others are correct that there is something fundamental to the construction of race that is rooted in the systematic dishonoring and subjugation of Black people by white people, then it would not simply be correct to say these two terms are "white" and "nonwhite." It is more rigorous to name them as white and Black, for the way in which race is constructed ultimately depends upon these two extreme poles. While in the past such a relationship was dependent upon a recognition of "not black," as the white human secured his humanity in not being a slave (that is, in not being nothing), this has changed in an age of "color-blind racism" or "racism without racists."' Now the demand is that the Black and white poles be recognized simply as two people, and that they enter into mutual recognition based upon some basic commonality. This is often what lies behind the refusal to take into account very different material conditions for a white subject and a Black subject. While segregation of communities continues, this is thought to arise "naturally," ignoring the ways in which Blacks and whites have very different access to business and housing loans or health care or education, or any number of other institutions that correspond to quality-of-life indicators. The demand is that one strip away various determinations of one's subject position so that recognition takes place simply between two people, instead of between a victim and her oppressor or one complicit with making her a victim. What is left unthought, occluded from vision altogether, is that there is an implicit whitening of what it means to be human here. There is a third term - what we might name as the anti-black world since it englobes the other two - that determines the relationship of the two. One does not see the world, for the world is the name for that framework through which you see everything else and you do so seemingly spontaneously. To be a recognizable person, entering into a relationship of good faith with another person, is to enter into certain conditions of the world. In simple terms, when the demand is to "treat people like people" this means ignoring the ways in which the world determines who gets seen as a person and who is not extended that privilege. It ignores that the demand is to see the person in the way one sees a white subject. Others have discussed at length Laruelle's valoriza-tion of cosmic blackness and they have done so with skill.' They tell us that Laruelle valorizes and names the blackness of the uni-verse because it is more generic than light, it is less than light - as a visual metaphor within philosophy, which has social conse-quences, it is valued less than light and thus it is named and cel-ebrated by non-philosophy. From the universe to the breaks in the social world, it is blackness that names the radically lived and unrepresentable.27

The subject position of the black is created by the world, and one names that blackness precisely because of the way in which the world has attempted to construct that subject as socially dead. Of course, from a non-philosophical perspective too, humans should all be treated as equal. But until the world that constitutes their inequality is ended, then one names these subjects either as Black, or victim, or (as we will see) Christ, because the (socially) dead may rise and in so doing disrupt the very world that brought about their death. This is how Laruelle understands victims. Not as weak and in need of saving, but as a fiction — as a subject — that is produced in a relative way by the world but that manifests a radical imma-nence that breaks from the dialectics of the world:

By its intrinsically in-person real, the victim is the counter-witness to nihilism, the same way that before it was the counter-example to creation ex nihilo. The victim carries with it resurrection, or rather the prior-to-the-first insurrection, against the dialectic of being and nothingness, which has no teal or lived sense. The victim is a power of "awakening" or "reprise" in the order of the lived experiences opposed to the simple dialectical or differential repetition of survival. Survival reinforces transcendence, an act that exceeds death or persecution and prolongs the world, whereas insurrection, which is the root of resurrection, weakens or debases this transcendence of a world to the state of lived experience.28